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The idea that we have a moral right to privacy that ought, as a matter 
of political morality, to be protected by the coercive authority of the law 
is of comparatively recent vintage.1  Prior to the seminal argument 
published by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in 1890 that 
there is a right to be let alone, there was no widely held belief that 
people have a right to privacy—moral or otherwise.2  Although people 
did believe that we have moral rights now thought to fall under the 
rubric of privacy, such as a right to physical separation in the borders of 
a physical home of one’s own, these rights were afforded adequate 
protection by other moral and legal rights up to that point.  In particular, 
my right to property allowed me to exclude you from obtaining information 
about me by being in my house or by peering into the windows if my 
blinds were drawn. 
The publication of Warren and Brandeis’s article triggered an evaluation 
of the issue of whether we have a privacy right that is independent of 
other moral rights we have, which may help in protecting some of the 
same interests, like the right to physical separation.  Legal protection 
against slander, once thought of as being justified in terms of damage to 
one’s property interest in one’s reputation, was also thought to reflect a 
morally protected interest in privacy—although truth remained an 
absolute defense.  New torts were created to protect this new interest 
where the truth of what was disclosed is not a defense against liability: 
dissemination of certain private facts is considered both morally wrong, 
regardless of whether or not they are true, and legally actionable in tort 
under certain circumstances. 
In the early 1960s, the Supreme Court began to develop a jurisprudence 
incorporating pieces of this interest into the Constitution.  A series of cases 
beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut hold that citizens have a right of 
privacy in personal decisions regarding marriage and reproduction.3  The 
Court vitiated, first, bans on sales of contraceptives to married couples, 
then to unmarried couples, and finally to minors.  Later cases established 
a constitutional right to abortion and a constitutional right to be free of 
coercive state prohibitions against certain sexual acts, such as anal sex 
performed by two consenting adult males. 
 1. Much of my discussion here is informed by the excellent discussion in AMITAI 
ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 188–96 (1999). 
 2. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 195–96, 205 (1890). 
 3. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down law prohibiting access 
of unmarried couples to contraception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking 
down law prohibiting miscegenation); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 
(1965) (striking down prohibition on distribution of contraception to married couples). 
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Although some of these constitutional rights are deeply contested and 
resented by more conservative segments of the population, most people 
seem to believe that we have a moral right to informational privacy—
informational and reproductive privacy are analytically and substantively 
distinct—that ought to be protected by the legal system.  I think it is fair 
to say that the claim that we have such a right is, at this point in time, 
utterly uncontroversial among mainstream conservatives and liberals, 
even if the content of this right and the nature of the appropriate legal 
protection—constitutional or statutory—is contested. 
In this essay, I consider the scope of this right to informational privacy 
relative to our interests in security and argue, in particular, that the right 
to privacy must yield to these interests in the case of a direct conflict.4  I 
offer arguments from a number of different perspectives.  I will, for 
example, begin with a case directly rooted in what I take to be ordinary 
case intuitions and then continue with an argument grounded in the 
distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value, which is thought to 
serve as a rough mark between what is important from a moral point of 
view and what is important from other points of view; though there can, 
obviously, be means to moral ends that will have moral significance in 
virtue of their relations to these ends.  However, I will largely be concerned 
with showing that the major mainstream approaches to justifying state 
authority presuppose or imply that security interests can justify infringements 
of privacy rights.  For example, I will argue that utilitarian and contractarian 
justifications of state authority entail that when privacy conflicts with the 
most important security interests, those security interests trump the privacy 
interests.  I conclude that the idea that privacy rights are absolute in the 
sense that they are never justifiably infringed, which is surprisingly 
common, is not only counterintuitive, but lacks any general theoretical 
support from any of the major mainstream theories of legitimacy. 
At the outset, I should point out that I do not attempt to resolve the 
very difficult questions associated with determining whether privacy 
interests genuinely conflict with security interests—and how to resolve 
those conflicts.  I think, for example, that the general principle purporting to 
justify the USA PATRIOT Act is correct, but that it does not justify 
many of the provisions of that Act, because those provisions do not 
address or resolve any genuine conflict between privacy and security.  I 
cannot defend the view here, but I doubt that allowing law enforcement 
 4. See discussion infra Part IV. 
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officers to inspect a patron’s library records does any work by way of 
making us safer from the threat of terrorism; terrorists are much too 
careful to do their research by checking out books from a public library.  
If this is correct, then the provision allowing inspection of library 
records is not justified by the general principle allowing infringements 
of privacy when necessary to protect important security interests, 
because there is no genuine conflict between privacy interests—assuming 
we have legitimate privacy interests in what we check out from a public 
library—and these more important security interests. 
Although an account that enables us to determine when security and 
privacy come into conflict and when security trumps privacy would be 
of great importance if I am correct about the general principle, my 
efforts in this essay will have to be limited to showing that the various 
theories of legitimacy presuppose or entail that, other things being equal, 
security is, as a general matter, more important than privacy. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Among the moral rights most people believe deserve legal protection, 
none is probably more poorly understood than privacy.  What exactly 
privacy is, what interests it encompasses, and why it deserves legal 
protection, are three of the most contentious issues in theorizing about 
information ethics and legal theory.  While there is certainly disagreement 
about the nature and importance of other moral rights deserving legal 
protection, like the right to property, the very concept of privacy is 
deeply contested.  Some people believe that the various interests commonly 
characterized as privacy interests have some essential feature in common 
that constitutes them as privacy interests; others believe that there is no 
such feature and that the concept of privacy encompasses a variety of 
unrelated interests, some of which deserve legal protection while others 
do not. 
Notably, many people tend to converge on the idea that privacy rights, 
whatever they ultimately encompass, are absolute in the sense that they 
may not legitimately be infringed for any reason.  While the various 
iterations of the USA PATRIOT Act are surely flawed with respect to 
their particulars, there are many people who simply oppose, on principle, 
even a narrowly crafted attempt to combat terrorism that infringes 
minimally on privacy interests.  There is no valid justification of any kind, 
on this absolutist conception, for infringing any of the interests falling 
within the scope of the moral right to privacy. 
It is perhaps worth noting that absolutist conceptions are not limited to 
privacy rights.  Some people take the position that the moral right to life 
is absolute; on an absolutist conception of the right to life, it is never 
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justified to take the life of a person—and this rules out not only the death 
penalty, but the use of deadly force in defense of the lives of innocent 
others from a culpable attack.  Many people take an absolutist view with 
respect to something they call a “right to information,” holding that there 
should be no restrictions of any kind, including legal protection of 
intellectual property rights, on the free flow of information.  As this view 
has most famously, and idiosyncratically, been put by John Perry Barlow, 
“information wants to be free.”5  When it comes to rights, absolutist talk 
among theorists, lawyers, and ordinary folk is not at all uncommon these 
days. 
Indeed, some people seem to think that rights are, by nature, absolute 
and hence that it is a conceptual truth that all rights are absolute.  
Consider the following quote from Patrick Murphy, a Democrat who ran 
for Congress in 2006: 
   I am also very concerned about the erosion of constitutional rights and civil 
liberties over the past few years.  I taught Constitutional Law at West Point, and 
it makes me so angry to see our elected leaders in Washington—specifically the 
White House and the Republican leadership in Congress—pushing policies that 
erode the foundation of this country.  The equal protection clause of the constitution 
is absolute.  The right to privacy is absolute.  The right to assemble is absolute.  
Yet time and time again, the administration has supported, and the Congressional 
leadership has supported nominees and policies that do not follow the constitution.  
With my background, I can add to this debate.  And I’m not afraid to take a 
stand for what’s right.6 
As Murphy explains it, every right in the Constitution is absolute and 
hence utterly without exception.  As there is nothing in the Constitution 
or any legal instrument or norm that suggests or entails that constitutional 
rights are absolute, it is reasonable to think that Murphy believes, as 
many people do, that it is part of the very meaning of having a right that 
it can never justifiably be infringed.  This is why debates about political 
issues are frequently framed in terms of whether there is some right that 
protects the relevant interests; rights provide the strongest level of moral 
or legal protection of the relevant interests. 
It is certainly true that rights provide a higher level of protection than 
any other considerations that are morally relevant, but it is not because 
rights are, by nature, absolute.  Rights provide robust protection of the 
 5. John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84, 89, available 
at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas.html. 
 6. Above Average Jane, http://aboveavgjane.blogspot.com/2005/12/interview-
with-patrick-murphy.html (Dec. 4, 2005, 23:06 EST) (emphasis added). 




relevant interests because it is a conceptual truth that the infringement of 
any right cannot be justified by an appeal of the desirable consequences 
of doing so.  No matter how many people it might make happy, it would 
be wrong to intentionally kill an innocent person because her right to life 
takes precedence over the interests of other people in their own happiness.  
As Ronald Dworkin famously puts this conceptual point, rights trump 
consequences.7 
But this conceptual truth about rights does not imply rights are, by 
nature, absolute.  The claim that rights trump consequences implies 
only that some stronger consideration than the desirable consequences of 
infringing a right can justify doing so.  This latter claim leaves open the 
possibility that there is some such consideration that would justify 
infringing some rights. 
One such candidate, of course, is the existence of other more important 
rights.  It is commonly thought that at least some rights are commensurable 
and can be ranked in a hierarchy that expresses the relative weight each 
right in the hierarchy has with respect to other rights.  For example, one 
might think that the right to life is at the top of the hierarchy of 
commensurable rights, and that property rights are in this hierarchy also.  
This would explain the common intuition that one may use deadly force 
when necessary to defend innocent lives from culpable attack, but not 
when necessary only to defend property rights from violation.  If, as 
seems clear from this example, it is possible for two rights to conflict 
and for one to outweigh the other, it follows that rights are not, by 
nature, absolute. 
What may explain the mistaken view that rights are necessarily absolute 
is confusion about the relationship of various terms that flesh out the 
status, origin, and contours of moral rights and obligations.  For example, 
rights are frequently described as “inviolable,” meaning that a right can 
never be justifiably violated.  This, of course, is a conceptual truth; to 
say that a right is violated is to say that its infringement is without 
justification.  But this does not imply that rights can never be justifiably 
infringed; a person’s right to life can be justifiably infringed if he 
culpably shoots at an innocent person and there is no other way to save 
that person’s life except through use of lethal force in defense of his life. 
Rights are also thought, by nature, to be supreme, relative to some 
system of norms—moral, social, or legal—in the sense that they cannot 
be defeated by other kinds of protections; moral rights are thought to be 
supreme over all other kinds of considerations, including social and legal 
rights.  But this does not imply that rights are absolute because it says 
 7. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi–xii, 86–88 (1978). 
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nothing about the relative importance of one right to another; it simply 
asserts that, by nature, rights outweigh all other relevant considerations.  
Supremacy and inviolability are part of the very nature of a right, but 
these properties do not entail that rights are, by nature, absolute. 
Of course, the negation of the claim that all rights are absolute does 
not imply that no rights are absolute.  The possibility of conflicts between 
any two rights does not preclude there being one right that wins every 
conflict because it is absolute, and hence, without exception.  A moral 
pacifist, for example, takes this view of the moral right to life and holds 
that intentional killing of a human being is always wrong.  Moreover, if 
there are two rights that do not come into conflict with each other and 
win in conflicts with all other rights, those two rights might be absolute.  
One might think, for example, that the rights to privacy and life can 
never conflict and that both are absolute. 
I am somewhat skeptical that any right is absolute in this strong sense, 
but if there are any, it will not be privacy.  As we will see in more detail, 
privacy is commensurable with other rights, like the right to life, which 
figures into the right to security.  It seems clear that privacy rights and 
the right to life can come into conflict.  For example, a psychologist 
might be justified in protecting a patient’s privacy interests even though 
doing so includes information that might prevent that person from 
committing a minor property crime of some kind, but she would not be 
justified in protecting that information if the psychologist knows its 
disclosure is necessary to prevent a murder.  In any event, I will discuss 
these kinds of examples in more detail below. 
II.  THE CONCEPT AND MORAL RIGHT OF INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY 
An account of the concept of privacy differs from a substantive 
account of the contours of the moral right to privacy, if any.  An account 
of the concept of privacy consists in a set of purely descriptive sentences 
that describe which interests are covered by the concept—without 
making, presupposing, or entailing any substantive claims about whether 
these interests are protected by morality or whether these interests 
should, as a matter of political morality, be protected by the law.  An 
account of the moral right of privacy is a normative set of propositions 
that describes those interests falling within the concept of privacy that 
are protected by a moral right.  A normative account may validate all or 
only some of the interests covered by the concept. 




There are a number of different views about the nature of privacy and 
the scope of what is protected.8  Some authors take a skeptical view, 
believing that the interests we characterize as “privacy” interests have 
nothing essential in common and are protected, to the extent they are 
protected, by different rights.9  Law and economics theorists argue that 
these interests ought not to be protected by law because they are 
economically inefficient.10  Feminists worry that privacy rights conceal 
oppressive practices of men against women, including domestic violence.11 
Others hold a positive conception of privacy and believe that moral 
interests in privacy are legitimately protected by the law.  Many of these 
theorists recognize that privacy interests seem to encompass a variety of 
different interests, including reproductive freedom, control over the free 
flow of information about oneself,12 the ability to exclude people from 
certain spaces and facts as a means of enhancing human dignity,13 
controlling access to ourselves,14 and maintaining intimacy in personal 
relationships.15  The earliest conception of privacy defined it as the right 
to be let alone.16  Although it has become clear that different cultures 
have different views about whether, why, and to what extent certain 
privacy interests are important, the assumption among these writers is 
that the cluster of interests we characterize as privacy deserves legal 
protection—regardless of whether there is any particular essential 
property all and only privacy interests instantiate. 
Although I will not say much by way of argument here, I will 
conceive of the relevant right as being a moral right to informational 
privacy that obligates one to refrain from attempting to procure certain 
kinds of information about others, without their consent or some other 
legitimate authorization, in which they have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  I exclude what is commonly called reproductive privacy, because I 
 8. See generally Judith DeCew, Privacy, in STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Edward 
N. Zalta ed., Fall 2006 ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/privacy (discussing various 
privacy theories).  My discussion here owes an obvious debt to this outstanding survey 
article. 
 9. Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295, 308 (1975). 
 10. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 235, 244–45 (1981). 
 11. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 193 
(1989). 
 12. W.A. Parent, Privacy, Morality and the Law, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269, 272–
73 (1983). 
 13. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to 
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 973–74, 1002–03 (1964). 
 14. Adam D. Moore, Privacy: Its Meaning and Value, 40 AM. PHIL. Q. 215, 215 
(2003). 
 15. James Rachels, Why Privacy is Important, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323, 325–330 
(1975). 
 16. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 193. 
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follow James Griffin in believing that the interests protected by the so-
called right to reproductive privacy are better conceptualized as being 
liberty interests.17  I exclude what is commonly expressed by a right to 
control access to oneself, because I think this amounts to a need for 
personal space and physical separation that has less to do with protecting 
informational privacy than with protecting us from feeling physically 
vulnerable because intruded upon.  I recently attended a concert, for 
example, in which my wife and I got fairly close to the stage during the 
opening act before the venue began to fill with people there for the 
headliners.  As the headliners began to play, people started crowding up 
against us, causing me, more than my wife, considerable discomfort.  
Such discomfort, however, had nothing to do with a sense that those 
persons would learn private facts about me; rather, I simply began to feel 
claustrophobic and somewhat threatened physically. 
There is no question, as Adam Moore points out in his important 
contribution to this symposium, that we are beings who need some physical 
separation from others, but it does not follow that what motivates this is 
a need to protect informational privacy.18  Indeed, as Moore points out, 
the need for physical separation seems to be universal among highly 
developed mammals—despite the fact that these other mammals lack the 
requisite linguistic or quasi-linguistic skills to process information.  Because 
they cannot process, much less understand, the notion, it is fallacious 
to infer a right to informational privacy from a need for physical 
separation, even if this need gives rise to a right; after all, the right of 
physical separation can be as adequately protected by property rights as 
by any other right. 
Indeed, this is probably true of some interests that are fairly 
characterized as informational privacy interests.  A store with a unisex 
bathroom that allows men and women to use the bathroom at the same 
time clearly threatens informational privacy; people tend to regard 
information about what they look like in various states of undress as 
private to members of the sex to which they are attracted, and tend to 
regard information about what they look like while eliminating waste as 
being private relative to just about everyone else—and legitimately so.  
But these interests, though properly conceptualized as concerned with 
 17. See James Griffin, The Human Right to Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 697, 
709–10, 717 (2007). 
 18. Adam D. Moore, Toward Informational Privacy Rights, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
809, 815–18 (2007). 
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information privacy, are adequately protected by a system of free 
enterprise anchored in private property rights, as these are traditionally 
conceived.  Such a business would probably not last very long in the 
marketplace.  Anyone who wants to make a profit selling things will simply 
have to recognize certain social conventions having to do with separation, 
personal space, and privacy of the person. 
For our purposes, it does not matter what view one takes on these 
issues.  My concern in this essay is to show that, from the standpoint of 
mainstream moral and political theorizing about the legitimacy of the 
state, informational privacy rights are below security rights in the moral 
hierarchy.  In other words, I reject any conception of privacy rights that 
regards them as absolute from the standpoint of morality—political and 
individual.  Although I cannot resolve the issue of whether such interests 
share a common essence, my thesis that security trumps privacy can be 
shown without taking a position on this important issue. 
III.  THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY AND ASSOCIATED                                    
MORAL INTERESTS 
A.  Elements of Security 
I take the concept of physical security to refer to a variety of interests 
a person has in the healthy continuation of her life and the life of her 
community.  By “healthy,” I mean a continuation of her life and community 
that is free of certain kinds of encumbrances characteristic of diseases 
and serious injuries in the case of a person’s life and characteristic of 
certain kinds of crises in the life of a community. 
At the outset, it is important to stress that security interests do not 
embrace interests not immediately related to the survival and minimal 
physiological well-being of the individual.  My interest in security 
encompasses my interest in continuing life, my interest in being free 
from the kind of physical injury that threatens my ability to provide for 
myself, my interest in being free from the kind of financial injury that 
puts me in conditions of health- or life-threatening poverty, and my 
interest in being free from psychological trauma inflicted by others that 
renders me unable to care for myself. 
My interest in security is a negative one in the sense that it is protected 
by a moral right constituted, in part, by moral obligations owed to me by 
other people to refrain from committing acts of violence or theft capable 
of causing serious threats to my health, well-being, and life.  While it is 
difficult to draw the line between a serious harm and a nonserious harm, 
it will have to suffice for my purposes to say that a serious harm is one 
that interferes significantly with the daily activities that not only give my 
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life meaning, but make it possible for me to continue to survive.  
Significant trauma to the brain not only interferes with many activities 
that constitute what Don Marquis calls the “goodness of life,”19 but 
also interferes with my ability to make a living teaching and writing 
philosophy—while a mildly bruised arm does not.  Where exactly to draw 
the line is not entirely clear, but for my purposes I do not think much 
turns on it as long as it is understood that security interests do not include 
minor injuries of any kind.  I imagine the boundaries of the relevant 
notion of seriousness are likely to be contested in any event, but all 
would agree that the interest in security, by nature, protects only against 
threats of serious injuries. 
It should be abundantly clear that morality protects these interests in 
the strongest terms available to it.  Unless one is a complete skeptic 
about morality and moral objectivity, little argument is needed to show 
that we have a moral right to be free from acts that pose a high risk of 
causing either our death or grievous injuries to our bodies.  Moreover, I 
would hazard that non-skeptics about morality would also accept that the 
moral right to physical security is sufficiently important that a state is, as 
a matter of political morality, obligated to protect it, by criminalizing 
attacks on it, as a condition of its legitimacy.  No state authority that 
failed to protect this right could be morally legitimate; at the very least 
no state authority that failed to do so could be justified in claiming a 
legitimate monopoly over the use of force. 
Security interests are not, however, just about our own well-being; they 
encompass the well-being of other persons whose activities conduce 
to our own physical security.  We are social beings who live in societies 
in which there is a pronounced division of labor that makes the security 
of one person dependent upon the security of other persons in a variety 
of ways—some more abstract, some less abstract. 
Here is perhaps an example from the extreme and quite abstract side 
of the spectrum: people legitimately worry about the economic prospects 
of the next generation for a variety of reasons.  First, while globalization 
is likely to expand the total pool of material resources, it will also 
redistribute them through the outsourcing of work.  Pro-globalization 
experts estimate that perhaps thirty to forty million jobs in the United 
 19. Don Marquis, Why Abortion Is Immoral, 86 J. PHIL. 183, 196 (1989). 




States will be lost in coming decades to the globalization process,20 
benefiting the countries that get these jobs, as well as the owners of the 
multinationals that redistribute these jobs, and harming those persons in 
this country who lose those jobs—if they are not, as some dissenters 
believe, easily replaced. 
Second, although the value of our GDP, around $13.8 trillion in 2007, 
continues to grow,21 so does our tax burden, now at over $5 trillion, and 
our federal debt, now at over $9 trillion, with about $2 trillion held by 
foreign governments.22  Approximately $430 billion per year must be spent 
by the government merely to service the public debt—pay interest 
without reducing principal.23  Baby boomers at the peak of their earning 
power and at the peak of the amounts that they pay in taxes are going to 
retire in droves in coming years, reducing the amount of tax revenues 
they contribute towards the federal budget, but also reducing the amount 
that they contribute towards servicing the debt.  Unless boomers leave a 
sufficient amount in inheritance to significantly reduce the debt burden 
after inheritance taxes, which assumes that they remain healthy and die 
suddenly without having to dip into their savings for extended around-
the-clock health care, the next generation will have to pay an increasing 
amount of their income in taxes to service the debt and possibly, if taxes 
are raised, to ensure continuation of the same governmental services. 
One can also expect that baby boomers will not continue to consume 
at existing lavish levels.  This means that not only will tax revenues fall 
with the mass retirement of the boomers, but consumer demand also will 
fall significantly, further reducing the demand for jobs in this country.  If 
people are buying less, far fewer people are needed to sell those goods.  
Unemployment rates may hit some highs not seen since the recession of 
the 1970s—or perhaps since the Great Depression. 
 20. Alan S. Blinder, Free Trade’s Great, But Offshoring Rattles Me, WASH. POST, May 6, 
2007, at B04, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/04/ 
AR2007050402555.html.  Alan S. Blinder is a professor of economics at Princeton University, 
vice chairman of Promontory Interfinancial Network, and vice chairman of the G7 
Group.  Id.  He is considered one of the most ardent proponents of globalization. 
 21.  INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL 
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Third, many economists are concerned that retired boomers will start 
selling off stock assets in their portfolios, resulting in a rash of sell 
orders that significantly depresses the value of the stock and of existing 
portfolios held by younger persons.  If so, younger persons face not only 
the specter of fewer meaningful job opportunities and increased tax 
burdens, but also portfolios that are suddenly worth significantly less in 
value. 
Fourth, the consensus among scientists is that global warming caused 
by greenhouse gas emissions will eventually culminate in significant 
changes in global climate adversely affecting the economies of many 
nations, especially the developing nations in Africa.  Republicans put 
off, as a matter of economic platform, trying to do anything that 
significantly reduces greenhouse gas emissions because, they claim, they 
are skeptical about the evidence for the greenhouse gas theory of global 
warming.  More likely, they resist environmental protection focused on 
reducing such emissions because it has an immediate cost to the 
economy in the form of increased prices for vehicles and gasoline, 
thereby leading to reduced demand and eventually to the loss of even 
more jobs.  If the theory is true and the predictions for the effects on 
future climate patterns are true, the next generation will not have the 
luxury of putting off facing the problems.  The consequences will have 
to be addressed by significant outlays of governmental revenue, which is 
another reason to worry that the next generation’s tax burden will be 
much greater and will significantly reduce their standard of living to 
such an extent that they will be the first generation in history to be less 
prosperous than their parents. 
Finally, the threat of global terrorism imposes significant economic 
costs on government that will continue to have to be funded with tax 
revenues or deficit spending.  Either way, when the boomers begin to 
retire, the next generation will have to contribute increasing amounts of 
their gross income to ensure national security, provided that the United 
States does not radically change its foreign policy objectives in the 
Middle East from protecting its own interests to pursuing a just and 
lasting peace among nations, regardless of whether their interests coincide 
with our own.  Given our sad record on this score—as is well known, we 
have a sad record of supporting despots hated by the people over whom 
they rule who oppress them with the threat of torture and imprisonment 
simply to ensure the continuation of a strategically valuable alliance—I 
am not optimistic. 
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The idea here is that, taken together, these considerations constitute a 
serious threat to the economic prospect of the next generation that is 
sufficiently grave, on my view, as to be properly characterized as a 
threat to their security.  If the above considerations turn out to be true, 
we may see a significant drop in disposable income figures—a trend that 
does not necessarily implicate security interests because it need not 
reach the point where it threatens the satisfaction of basic needs.  But we 
might also see much higher rates of unemployment than we have seen 
since the Great Depression—a trend that does implicate security interests, 
as unemployment rates positively correlate with rates of homelessness, 
substance abuse, mental illness, hunger, and diminished access to health 
care of every kind. 
In this kind of economic case, however, the threat arises because of 
changes in behavior over a large class of persons.  Of course, an 
economic threat rising to the level of a security threat can be precipitated 
by one person, such as a thief or embezzler, but threats that result from 
general downward trends in economic activity represent threats arising 
from the changes in the behavior of the many players in the various 
markets for goods and services.  The range of security interests includes 
serious threats to economic well-being that result from changes in the 
behavior of very large numbers of people. 
This is not particularly controversial.  If the entire Canadian population 
suddenly stormed the U.S. borders in an attempt to wage war against the 
United States, it would constitute a threat to our security both as individuals 
and as members of a society whose existence ensures our survival and 
well-being.  In part, what explains the moral importance of security interests 
is not just the content of certain interests they include, such as life, but 
the range of interests and range of threats that are encompassed by this 
notion.  As was true of the concept of privacy, an analysis of the concept 
of security entails nothing about whether our interests are protected by 
morality; substantive argument is needed to do this work.  But understanding 
the concept of privacy helps us to see that the idea that such interests are 
of moral significance is both intelligible and plausible; the same is true 
of an analysis of the concept of security, conceived of as including 
serious threats to economic interests.  Even at this preliminary point, one 
would expect security interests to be, at the very least, deserving, as a 
matter of political morality, of legal protection. 
B.  Interests in Personal vs. Collective Security 
As it turns out, the concept of security is ambiguous as between two 
interpretations.  My interest in personal security extends no further than 
my having an interest in my own security.  Accordingly, my interest in 
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personal security is concerned with my being protected from violent acts 
of assault and theft, but is indifferent with respect to other people being 
protected from such acts.  My interest in collective security is an interest 
I have in the continuing existence of the social group I inhabit as providing 
an environment in which I and other people are free from the threats of 
violence and theft, and hence, which provides necessary, though not 
sufficient, prerequisites for the possibility of leading a meaningful 
human life.  My interest in “national security,” of course, is an interest in 
collective security—in particular, an interest in the continuing existence 
of the national group to which I belong. 
There is, of course, an obvious relation between the two: if I live in a 
society that lacks collective security, then it is highly probable that I will 
also lack personal security.  If people everywhere are rioting, then my 
individual, or personal, well-being is threatened—to some extent—even 
if I am sitting at home with all the doors bolted shut.  If I feel I have to 
sit in a “safe room” to escape the direct threat to my security, then I am 
no longer leading a meaningful, flourishing life.  For all practical purposes, 
my life is organized around defending myself from attacks on my life—
surely not a desirable state of affairs for any practically rational being. 
It might be that some persons are so selfish that they care about 
collective security only insofar as it impacts their own security, but I 
would be surprised—at the risk of overestimating the capacity for human 
empathy—if this were generally true.  There is no doubt that there are 
many people with pathological psychological conditions who care only 
about their own interests and would hence care about collective security 
only because it bears on their personal security; for these people, the 
interests of other people count for nothing.  But most people who share a 
communal life with us in society form social bonds—bonds that extend 
to people we have never met in virtue of their being a member of the 
same tribe or community.  Although the empathetic bonds extended to 
those solely in virtue of tribe membership will be considerably weaker 
than those extended in virtue of the development of mutually satisfying 
personal relationships, they are significant bonds.  Most of us who 
watched the floodwaters rise on people clinging for life on their roofs in 
New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina cared very deeply 
about what was happening to them.  We care, of course, about our own 
security, but we also care a great deal about the security of our 
community—and not just because it bears on our safety and security. 




I believe that morality protects some of these interests in collective 
and personal security to such an extent that they rise to the level of a 
right.  Nevertheless, it is not at all clear how to draw the line between 
those interests not covered by a right to security and those interests 
covered by a right to security—and I cannot attempt to do so here. 
The point I want to make here is that I am perfectly comfortable 
assuming our moral interests in privacy rise to the level of a right that a 
legitimate state is obligated to protect as a precondition of its legitimacy, 
and that, as I will show from a number of vantage points, the same is 
true of the right to security.  In addition, I will provide a number of 
arguments—some of them grounded in individual morality and some 
grounded in major approaches to theorizing about the conditions a state 
must satisfy to be morally legitimate—that the right to security trumps 
the right to privacy when the two come into conflict. 
IV.  WHAT EXACTLY DOES “SECURITY TRUMPS PRIVACY” MEAN? 
The meaning of the claim that security trumps privacy is not 
immediately obvious.  At the outset, this much has been clear: if it is true 
that security trumps privacy, then it is also true that privacy is not an 
absolute right.  Since the slogan that security trumps privacy entails that 
when security and privacy are in some sort of direct conflict, security 
defeats privacy, it follows that privacy is not absolute.24 
But, quite frankly, this does not tell us much; the claim that privacy is 
nonabsolute does not tell us anything about how it should be weighed 
against other nonabsolute rights, and I do not wish to claim that security 
is an absolute right because I think this thesis is as counterintuitive as the 
thesis that privacy is an absolute right.  If it were true, for example, that 
security was an absolute right, and privacy necessarily yields in the 
event of any conflict at all, then it would follow that it is morally 
justifiable for the state to sacrifice all interests in privacy if necessary to 
achieve just the slightest gain in security.  I take this to be so obviously 
false as to constitute a counterexample to the claim that security is 
absolute, at least relative to privacy. 
The claim that security trumps privacy is meant to express the more 
intuitive, but admittedly vague, idea that security and privacy are 
commensurable values and that, as a general matter, security is a more 
 24. I am deeply indebted to David Brink for making me aware of the need to 
address this issue in some way, although all I can really do here is acknowledge the 
epistemic issues that would have to be worked out in order to fully flesh out the content 
of the claim that security trumps privacy.  I have no illusions that I have said anywhere 
near enough to deal adequately with his concerns or with the theoretical issue presented 
here.  That will have to be a topic for another paper. 
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important value from the standpoint of morality than privacy.  This does 
not commit me to the claim that all values are commensurable; perhaps 
there are two values that simply cannot be weighed against one another.  
But it does commit me to the claim that there is a hierarchy of 
commensurable morally protected interests and rights, which include 
security, privacy, and perhaps others, and that security has a higher 
position in the hierarchy than privacy.  Indeed, I am tempted to think 
that security interests—construed to include freedom from grievous 
threats to well-being, which include death, grievous bodily injury, and 
financial damage sufficiently extensive to threaten the satisfaction of 
basic needs and hence survival of a person—are at the top of the moral 
hierarchy, encompassing as they do the rights to life and physical 
preservation. 
The epistemology of resolving conflicts among rights is somewhat 
easier in the case of other interests that are not quite as broad as the 
security interest, as defined here.  To say that the right to life trumps the 
right to property seems to entail that if one is confronted with a choice in 
which one has to damage one person’s property or end the life of another 
person, it will always be the case that the right thing to do is to damage 
the property. 
The epistemological problem of articulating a methodology for 
balancing competing security and privacy claims is quite difficult, and I 
cannot claim to be able to do that here because security might, in 
general, be more important than privacy, but privacy interests sometimes 
win in a conflict with security interests.  It would not, for example, be 
permissible to disclose the most private information of one thousand 
people to save one person from being bruised severely on her leg.  The 
relevant elements of the respective interests fall well short of being of 
comparable importance relevant to the privacy and security of affected 
persons. 
Given the difficulties associated with working out a detailed epistemology 
of weighing competing privacy and security claims, I will have to 
content myself here with resting on another less than fully perspicuous 
formula to express my view.  Other things being equal, a security interest 
defeats a privacy interest that has the same level of moral importance to 
privacy that the first element has to security. 
Here is an example of what I have in mind, but it will fall far short of 
providing the sort of epistemic principle that would enable us to sort 
these issues out.  If the life of one innocent person is at stake and can be 
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saved only by disclosing the most private information of another innocent 
person, it is morally permissible, though obviously regrettable, to disclose 
that information in order to save the life.  Here the most important value 
protected by security comes into conflict with the most important value 
protected by information privacy; the result in this case is that the 
security interest is more important. 
Of course, this case—as well as the case in which we can save 
someone from a bruised leg only by disclosing the most private information 
of one thousand people—is theoretically uninteresting because it is so 
easily resolved.  The cases of real interest are those posed by various 
provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act where there is no consensus 
among theorists and laypersons about how to balance the competing 
interests—even where it is clear that there is a genuine conflict that a 
particular provision is intended to resolve. 
One conspicuous class of issues involves how to compare a case in 
which some more important element of security that involves a small 
class of persons, possibly consisting of one, is weighed against some less 
important element that involves a much larger class of persons.  There 
are two dimensions to balancing these interests: (1) the importance of 
the interest relative to the type of interest involved; and (2) the number 
of people whose interests in security are implicated compared to the 
number of people whose interests in privacy are implicated.  Both factors 
count for something in the weighing process, but I have disappointingly 
little to say by way of clarifying how the latter issue should be worked 
out.  Again, the epistemological challenges are so difficult, multifaceted, 
and nuanced that I could not even begin to take a stab at them here. 
How to resolve either issue in a principled way is not something I can 
admit to having even the beginnings of a theoretical account for; I 
merely want to make a multifaceted case that security interests are, as a 
general matter, ranked more highly on the hierarchy of commensurable 
moral values than privacy interests.  This would entail that the class of 
all security interests possessed in whatever form by every person is more 
important, from the standpoint of morality, than the class of all privacy 
interests possessed in whatever from by the same individual.  This, as we 
have seen, is compatible with situations in which someone’s privacy 
interests defeat someone else’s security interests. 
But something like a detailed epistemology would be needed to make 
out a rigorous theoretical explanation of the idea that, other things being 
equal, security interests trump privacy interests that are as important to 
privacy as the security interests are to security.  First, one would need 
some sort of vertical ranking of both security and privacy interests that 
includes some mechanism for deciding where along the spectrum of 
privacy and security interests competing interests are of comparable 
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internal importance.  Thus, for example, it is easy to see that life trumps 
the most private facts about oneself, but not so easy to see where the 
interest in financial security lines up with other information about oneself 
that is private.  Second, one would have to come up with a calculus for 
aggregating security and privacy interests across persons so that they can 
be properly weighed against one another.  Is one life more valuable than 
the most private information of ten people?  One hundred?  One thousand?  
The problem here arises because the number of persons whose security 
interests are implicated might not be the same as the number whose 
privacy interests are implicated.  Finally, one has to have some sort of 
reasonably accurate probability calculus for determining the likelihood 
that a measure proposing a trade of privacy for security will result in 
securing the appropriate increase in security without causing a greater 
diminishment in privacy than can be justified by that increase.  As is 
readily evident, these are three quite difficult problems to work out. 
In closing, I should point out that privacy interests and security 
interests are commensurable in the sense that they can at least sometimes 
be compared and weighed accurately in the case of conflict.  This is 
surely so some of the time; as noted above, the interest someone has in 
the privacy of information about his being homosexual cannot outweigh 
the interests of 300,000 people whose lives depend on the disclosure 
of that information.  This, of course, is a far-fetched case, but it demonstrates 
beyond doubt that privacy and security interests will frequently be 
commensurable along both dimensions—the dimension of importance 
and the dimension of assessing that importance across different size 
classes of individuals—a prerequisite for being able to claim that, as a 
general matter, security interests, properly defined, are more important, 
other things being equal, than informational privacy interests. 
This, however, should not be taken to imply that security and privacy 
interests are always commensurable.  It might be that sometimes conflicts 
arise between security interests and privacy interests that cannot 
accurately be weighed because they are simply incommensurable values.  
For example, some property interests might not be commensurable with 
some privacy interests; sentimental attachments that are vital to a person’s 
sense of well-being might—or might not be—commensurable with 
informational privacy interests.  Nothing in the thesis of this essay should 
be construed to imply that we can always resolve conflicts—or even that 
an omniscient God can always do so—because nothing in this essay 
should be construed as implying or presupposing that it is a necessary 
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truth that the relevant values are commensurable.  I would surmise that 
in the vast majority of cases they surely are, but there might be some 
small class of cases in which they are not.  I am not entirely sure of 
whether this latter claim is true, but the issue is much too complicated to 
take on here.  I simply want to gesture in the direction of the potential 
concerns here. 
V.  THE ARGUMENT FROM INTUITIVE CASE JUDGMENTS 
From an intuitive standpoint, the idea that the right to privacy is an 
absolute right seems utterly implausible.  Intuitively, it seems clear that 
there are other rights that are so much more important that they easily 
trump privacy rights in the event of a conflict.  For example, if a psychologist 
knows that a patient is highly likely to commit a murder, then it is, at the 
very least, morally permissible to disclose that information about the 
patient in order to prevent the crime—regardless of whether such 
information would otherwise be protected by privacy rights.  Intuitively, 
it seems clear that life is more important from the standpoint of morality 
than any of the interests protected by a moral right to privacy. 
Still one often hears—primarily from academics in information 
schools and library schools, especially in connection with the controversy 
regarding the USA PATRIOT Act—the claim that privacy should never 
be sacrificed for security, implicitly denying what I take to be the 
underlying rationale for the PATRIOT Act.  This also seems counterintuitive 
because it does not seem unreasonable to believe we have a moral right 
to security that includes the right to life.  Although this right to security 
is broader than the right to life, the fact that security interests include our 
interests in our lives implies that the right to privacy trumps even the 
right to life—something that seems quite implausible from an intuitive 
point of view.  If I have to give up the most private piece of information 
about myself to save my life or protect myself from either grievous 
bodily injury or financial ruin, I would gladly do so without hesitation.  
There are many things I do not want you to know about me, but should 
you make a credible threat to my life, bodily integrity, financial security, 
or health, and then hook me up to a lie detector machine, I will truthfully 
answer any question you ask about me.  I value my privacy a lot, but I 
value my life, bodily integrity, and financial security much more than 
any of the interests protected by the right to privacy. 
It is true, of course, that the hierarchy defined by my personal 
attributions of value may not reflect the hierarchy implied by the moral 
values themselves, but I would be surprised if there are any rational 
persons who would react differently to the choice presented above.  
Personal valuations can be idiosyncratic and for this reason not tell us 
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anything about the corresponding moral values.  But if it is true, as I 
would hypothesize, that very few, if any, people would choose to withhold 
some piece of private information about themselves if needed to save 
their lives, or protect them from serious physical injury or financial ruin, 
that is a pretty good reason to think that these valuations do tell us 
something about morality.  It would be very odd if, on the one hand, all, 
or nearly all, rational persons assign greater value to what I have described 
as the most important of security interests than to the most important of 
privacy interests where there is a genuine conflict between the two but, 
on the other hand, morality assigned more value to privacy than to 
security. 
It is fairly easy to see, however, that my intuitions are widely shared in 
the United States.  As an empirical matter, citizens in the United States 
frequently indicate a willingness to trade privacy for enhanced security.  
For example, a Harris poll conducted on October 4, 2004, three years 
after the attacks of 9/11, produced the following results: 
•      Two-thirds (67%) percent favor “closer monitoring of banking and credit 
card transactions” up slightly from 64 percent in February (and down 
from 81 percent in September 2001). 
•      Six in ten (60%) favor “adoption of a national I.D. system for all U.S. 
citizens” up from February’s 56 percent (down from 68% in September 
2001). 
•      Those who favor “law enforcement monitoring of Internet discussions” 
[have] increased significantly from 50 percent earlier this year to a 
current 59 percent.  This is only somewhat lower than the 63 percent who 
felt this way in September 2001. 
•      Those who favor “expanded government monitoring of cell phones and 
email” have risen to 39 percent, with 56 percent opposed.  In February 
this year, a somewhat lower 36 percent minority favored this. 
  . . . . 
•       83 percent continue to favor “stronger document and physical security 
checks for travelers,” basically unchanged since February (93% in 
September 2001). 
•      82 percent continue to support “expanded undercover activity to 
penetrate groups under suspicion,” up from 80 percent in the February 
poll (93% in September 2001). 
•       60 percent continue to support “expanded camera surveillance on streets and 
in public places,” virtually unchanged since February (63% in September 
2001).25 
 25. HARRIS INTERACTIVE, THE HARRIS POLL #73: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF LIKELIHOOD OF 
FUTURE TERRORIST ATTACK LEADS TO CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR TOUGH SURVEILLANCE 
MEASURES TO PREVENT TERRORISM (2004), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/ 
index.asp?PID=501. 




One might be tempted to argue that these results should not be taken as 
typical because the poll was taken only three years after the 9/11 attacks, 
and people have become somewhat more critical of late of the 
government’s efforts to combat terrorism that implicate privacy.  But the 
claim is not that the people always favor enhanced security measures 
even when they impinge on privacy interests; the claim is rather that 
when people are convinced that they face a credible deadly threat of 
some sort—that is, one that satisfies some threshold level of probability 
for success—they are generally willing to sacrifice privacy interests, 
even important ones, to reduce the probability of success.  Criticisms of 
recent measures primarily express the view that they impinge upon 
privacy without significantly reducing the probability of a terrorist 
attack on U.S. soil.  That, unlike the poll results described above, tells us 
nothing about common intuitions regarding how to balance security and 
privacy as a general matter. 
More tellingly, people will frequently choose to give up a variety of 
more important interests to protect security interests.  A 1996 poll found 
that 77% of Russians valued social order over democracy and hence can 
be interpreted as believing that security interests are more important than 
autonomy interests, while only 9% valued democracy over social order.26  
This not only speaks to the fact that ordinary intuitions commonly 
converge upon valuing security interests over other interests like privacy 
and autonomy, but also attests to the ill-advisedness of the sort of market 
fundamentalism embraced by the International Monetary Fund in 
attempting to remake the former Soviet Union in the image of the 
United States by immediately transforming the Russian economy from 
being centrally organized around state planning and state ownership of 
the means of production to one of essentially unrestricted free enterprise.  
The result has been a disaster; some Russians have gotten very rich, 
while others fall behind economically and are far more vulnerable to 
falling victim to crime of all kinds, leaving overall a diminished sense of 
well-being among the Russian people.  Sadly, this is a mistake that the 
IMF continues to repeat all over the developing world—although this 
might be explained, in part, by the fact that Western multinational 
corporations almost always somehow find a way to come out ahead 
because these corporations derive the benefit of economic protectionist 
mechanisms, like tariffs, that make it impossible for developing nations 
to compete. 
If this is true, and it is also true, as I am assuming, that individuals 
have a moral right to privacy that is sufficiently important from the 
 26. Michael Kramer, The People Choose, TIME, May 27, 1996, at 48, 56. 
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standpoint of political morality that states are obligated to protect it as a 
condition of moral legitimacy, then it follows that individuals have a 
moral right to security that is sufficiently important from the standpoint 
of political morality that states are obligated to protect it as a condition 
of moral legitimacy; if morality affords more protection to X than to Y 
and morality protects Y as a right, then it follows that morality protects X 
as a right.  Moreover, insofar as morality provides more protection to the 
right to security than the right to privacy, it follows that the right to 
security outweighs the right to privacy, other things being equal—whatever 
that ultimately turns out to mean.  Insofar as political morality requires, 
as a condition of state legitimacy, the protection of the moral right to Y 
by legal restrictions on behavior, it also requires, as a condition of state 
legitimacy, the protection of the moral right to X if X is of greater moral 
importance than Y.  Since privacy and security can clearly conflict on 
matters central to each, it follows that the right to privacy is not absolute. 
Of course, arguments of this sort can take us only so far.  First, 
whether or not intuitions converge on a moral issue is a contingent 
matter that can only be determined by empirical sociological inquiry, 
something I am not prepared to do.  Second, there may be more compelling 
general theoretical considerations that contradict these intuitions and 
convince us to give them up to achieve general coherence in our belief 
structure.  Third, one person’s intuitions about the importance of life relative 
to the most private facts about her provides very limited evidence for the 
claim that, other things being equal, security trumps privacy.  Finally, in 
the absence of the appropriate metric for ranking privacy and security on 
their own hierarchies and a means of determining when security and 
privacy interests fall on comparable spots in that hierarchy, these 
intuitions, widespread though they might be—as reflected in the polls 
described above—will not tell us anything more than that privacy rights 
or interests are not absolute.  They will not tell us that, other things being 
equal, security is the more important value. 
VI.   CONSIDERATIONS OF INTRINSIC AND INSTRUMENTAL VALUE 
In determining what morally protected interests people might have, 
philosophers frequently distinguish two kinds of value.  An entity has 
instrumental value if and only if it has value as a means to some other 
valuable end.  In contrast, an entity has intrinsic value if and only if it 
has value as an end in itself.  Money is an example of something with 
only instrumental value; while money clearly has value as a means to 
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other ends like nutrition and recreation, it does not seem to have any 
value as an end in itself.  In contrast, one’s own happiness is an example 
of something with intrinsic value.  While it might make sense to value 
some other person’s happiness as a means to some other end, it makes 
little sense to think of one’s own happiness as primarily a means to some 
other end. 
There are two concepts of intrinsic value that make use of this distinction— 
one primarily normative, and the other primarily descriptive.  The normative 
concept is concerned with what rational moral agents ought to value as 
deserving of respect as ends in themselves.  An entity intrinsically 
valuable in this sense has value as an end in itself, regardless of whether 
any rational agents actually value it this way.  Thus, attributions of this 
kind of value are normative in the sense they are independent of the 
actual valuations of rational agents: if every rational agent failed to value 
an entity E with intrinsic value in this sense, each would be making a 
moral mistake.  Attributions of intrinsic value in this normative sense are 
disconnected from what we actually value as an empirical matter. 
Entities with intrinsic value in this sense are moral patients entitled to 
moral respect.  Unlike something with only instrumental value, something 
with intrinsic value may not be used by an agent without some thought 
to its interests.  Whereas the appropriate manner for thinking about 
things with only instrumental value is cost-benefit analysis, intrinsically 
valuable things have a right to some consideration in a moral agent’s 
deliberations.  For example, if nonhuman animals have intrinsic value in 
this sense, moral agents have an obligation to consider their interests in 
deliberations about acts that may affect those interests. 
In contrast, the descriptive concept is concerned with identifying the 
sort of ends we characteristically pursue; the issue here is what, as an 
empirical matter, we typically regard worth pursuing for its own sake.  
An entity has intrinsic value in this sense if and only if, as an empirical 
matter, most of us actually value it as an end in itself; a thing has 
instrumental value if and only if most of us value it as a means. 
The moral significance of being regarded as an end in itself by moral 
persons—that is, of having intrinsic value in the descriptive sense—is 
different from that of being owed an obligation of respect—that is, of 
having intrinsic value in the normative sense.  As persons, we have a 
morally protected interest in what we typically intrinsically value that is 
fundamental in not deriving from some other more basic interest.  
Persons have a special moral status in the world in virtue of being, or 
potentially being, both moral agents with obligations and moral patients 
with rights.  Respect for beings with this status entails some measure of 
respect for their characteristic ultimate ends. 
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This helps to explain why we have fundamental moral rights to life 
and liberty.  It is surely true that we view our lives and our liberty as 
instrumentally valuable; being free and alive are necessary conditions 
for pursuing a life that is happy.  But it is also clearly true, I think, that 
we typically view continued conscious existence and liberty as vitally 
important ends in themselves; we care passionately about these things 
for their own sakes—and not merely because they are useful for other 
purposes.  Given the vital intrinsic importance of these ends, it is not 
surprising that they are the objects of fundamental rights. 
Still, the fact that we intrinsically value these states does not fully 
explain why we have rights protecting them.  Whether and to what extent 
morality affords protection to a person’s interest in her ultimate ends 
depends on the nature of these ends and on the extent to which they can 
be adequately protected by moral rules given facts about human nature 
and the social arrangements under which we live.  Although my interest 
in my life as an end in itself is clearly protected by a right to life, my 
interest in my happiness as an end in itself is not protected by a right to 
happiness.  My achieving happiness can be facilitated by my rights to 
life and liberty, but my happiness depends on a host of factors that 
cannot be protected by the characteristic mechanisms of moral and legal 
obligation.  It makes no sense to think that a woman with whom I am in 
love is morally obligated to return that love—even though my happiness 
may depend crucially on her loving me the way I love her.  A person’s 
happiness depends on the job she gets, the social connections she enjoys, 
and the sense of her own worth.  These are simply not the kinds of things 
that can be protected or guaranteed by rights and obligations—moral or 
otherwise—in part, because such protections would infringe, without 
adequate justification, the rights of other people; surely, every person has a 
moral right to decide for herself with whom she is in love.  Accordingly, 
the characteristic assignment of intrinsic value to X is not a sufficient 
condition for having a fundamental right to X. 
Surprisingly, the characteristic assignment of intrinsic value to X is not 
even a necessary condition for having a fundamental right to X.  Many 
persons believe we have a fundamental moral right to property, but it 
seems clear that property does not have value as an end in itself; someone 
who pursues property for its own sake, rather than as a means to other 
ends, seems to have badly misunderstood the value of property. 
One does not, of course, have to take the position that property is a 
natural moral right, rather than a social right conferred by society.  The 
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idea that we have a moral right to take things external to our persons out 
of a commons is somewhat less natural than the idea that we have a 
moral right to life, which does not extend beyond the physical boundaries of 
our own person and thus affords no right to things external to us.  Indeed, 
the idea that property rights are moral in character has been notoriously 
difficult to defend; the best strategy continues to be a Lockean strategy 
that grants us such a right to things when we invest our labor in them 
and create new value, but no one has adequately explained why it is not 
equally reasonable to conclude that, as a moral matter, we lose our labor 
when we put it into something external to ourselves. 
Instead, one can conceive of property as a social right but, either way, 
what explains why we have a right to property undoubtedly makes 
reference to the importance of property to well-being.  Not only does it 
seem necessary for our survival that we can exclude persons from 
appropriating at least some material objects, it also seems that excluding 
others from appropriating an object O that satisfies some want always 
has instrumental value because it endows O with exchange value that 
enables O to be exchanged for another object that can satisfy some want.  
The importance of property to well-being certainly plays a role in our 
having a right to property—regardless of whether it is social or moral in 
character. 
But what explains why a right to property is fundamental has to do 
with the relationship of its content to the content of other rights.  While 
property might be necessary for survival, the right to life does not imply 
a right to property.  My right to life implies that you are obligated not to 
kill me, but it does not imply that you are obligated to refrain from 
appropriating all objects, including those not necessary for my survival, 
that I have claimed as my own.  The right to exclude other persons from 
appropriating an object, which is central to the notion of a property right, 
may conduce in some cases to survival, and hence, relates to the interest 
in life, but it cannot be derived from the right to life.  Insofar as similar 
things can be said about the relationship of the right to property to other 
fundamental rights, the right to property is fundamental despite the fact 
that property lacks intrinsic value. 
There is no general rule linking fundamental rights and instrumental 
value.  There might be many entities we characteristically value as a 
means without having rights to them.  For example, it seems reasonable 
to think that we typically value sexual experience as a means to some 
deeper intimacy or as a means of affirming our sexual identities.  But it 
would not follow that we have some sort of right to sexual experience—
though we obviously have basic liberty rights that entitle us to pursue 
such experiences within limits.  How much protection, if any, morality 
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affords our interest in what we instrumentally value presumably differs 
from interest to interest. 
In any event, the following can safely be said about the significance of 
rights that protect what is intrinsically valuable relative to rights that 
protect what is instrumentally valuable.  If X is a right that protects something 
that is instrumentally valuable as a means to Y, something that is intrinsically 
valuable and protected by a right, Y is the more important value of the 
two from the standpoint of morality because the value of X derives from 
the value of Y in the following sense: but for the intrinsic value of Y, X 
would not be instrumentally important, and hence, would receive no 
moral protection. 
It seems to follow that rights the value of which is purely instrumental 
are not as important as rights providing the ends to which the former 
rights are intended to secure.  If our interests in X is purely instrumental 
as a means to securing Y, and both X and Y are morally protected in 
virtue of our interests in them, it seems clear that what is of ultimate 
importance from the standpoint of morality is Y.  X is protected only 
because it facilitates the achievement of Y.  If X did not conduce to Y in 
the appropriate way, X would not be protected, but Y would be, other 
things being equal.  Since Y is the interest of ultimate value that is not 
contingent upon securing something else of moral importance, and X 
lacks this property, it seems reasonable to conclude that, from the 
standpoint of morality, Y is more important an interest than X. 
This is surely true of property.  As John Locke points out, we need to 
be able to consume material things to survive and to flourish in all the 
ways that human beings ought, as a moral matter, to flourish.27  Property 
is ultimately protected then because of its crucial instrumentality to the 
achievement of these ends: without property, neither brute survival nor a 
morally meaningful life is possible.  But clearly property is less important 
than brute survival; and property is also less important than whatever 
aspects of human flourishing to which property is essential that are 
deemed significant enough to be ultimate ends protected by morality.  
This explains why property rights are less important than rights to life 
and liberty—though neither of the latter need necessarily be construed as 
being absolute. 
 27. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 18–30 (C.B. Macpherson 
ed., Hackett 1980) (1690). 
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The same also seems to be true of the right to informational privacy 
and the right to, or interest in, security.  Informational privacy is valuable 
only as a means to an end.  If certain pieces of information about me 
were not likely to be used in ways that have damaging consequences to 
my well-being, I would not care one bit whether they were widely 
known.  My hair is dirty blond, something I take no pains to hide 
because the risk that someone will use this information to discriminate 
against me in some way that significantly diminishes my well-being is 
virtually nil.  In contrast, I care about personal information about my 
health because my being at high genetic risk for a particular disease, if 
this turns out to be true, might lead a potential employer not to hire me.  
There is no piece of personal information about myself that I value keeping 
private as an end in itself; privacy is all about avoiding embarrassing and 
otherwise damaging social consequences. 
Security, on the other hand, is something I value instrumentally because it 
is a precondition for living a meaningful, enjoyable human life, but it is 
also something I value intrinsically.  Continued sentient existence, bodily 
integrity—for example, having four limbs that I can move by volition—
and financial security are ends in themselves and hence intrinsically 
valuable.  Indeed, in many cases, I value privacy of information as a means 
to protecting security interests that I value intrinsically.  Insofar as this is 
true, it seems reasonable to conclude that security is a more important 
value than privacy from the vantage point of individual and political 
morality. 
This seems to be a view shared by other theorists.  John Finnis, for 
example, attempts to identify those things we value intrinsically as the 
“basic goods” that are ultimately the subjects of foundational moral 
principles.  Rejecting the claim that there are no values that are universally 
shared across cultures, Finnis identifies the following values as forming 
the foundation for moral rules: 
   Students of ethics and of human cultures very commonly assume that cultures 
manifest preferences, motivations, and evaluations so wide and chaotic in their 
variety that no values or practical principles can be said to be self-evident to 
human beings . . . . 
   . . . [But recent anthropological] surveys entitle us . . . to make some confident 
assertions.  All human societies show a concern for the value of human life; in 
all, self-preservation is generally accepted as a proper motive for action, and in 
none is the killing of other human beings permitted without some fairly definite 
justification.  All human societies regard the procreation of a new human life as 
in itself a good thing unless there are special circumstances.  No human society 
fails to restrict sexual activity; in all societies there is some prohibition of incest, 
some opposition to boundless promiscuity and to rape, some favour for stability 
and permanence in sexual relations.  All human societies display a concern for 
truth, through education of the young in matters not only practical (e.g. 
avoidance of dangers) but also speculative or theoretical (e.g. religion).  Human 
beings, who can survive infancy only by nurture, live in or on the margins of 
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some society which invariably extends beyond the nuclear family, and all 
societies display a favour for the values of co-operation, of common over 
individual good, of obligation between individuals, and of justice within groups.  
All know friendship.  All have some conception of meum and tuum, title or 
property, and of reciprocity.  All value play, serious and formalized, or relaxed 
and recreational.28 
On Finnis’s view, these values are sought as ends in themselves in all 
cultures and societies across all times and constitute universal intrinsic 
values that form the goods that are foundational to human well-being 
and flourishing.  As such, these goods define the basic principles of morality 
that protect people in their pursuit of such goods by creating rights and 
obligations and encourage such pursuit by characterizing it as “good.” 
Finnis’s view should not be construed as implying that anything 
omitted from the list receives no protection whatsoever from morality.  
His intent here is simply to identify the foundational goods—that is, the 
goods that are sought as ends in themselves because their achievement is 
constitutive of a good, flourishing human life.  Insofar as some X is 
essential to achieving one of the basic goods and is not otherwise 
morally objectionable, it is reasonable to think that morality will afford 
some protection to efforts on the part of persons to achieve X; but, again, 
the value of X will be derivative of and of less importance than the value 
of the basic good X is needed to achieve. 
It is noteworthy here that Finnis’s list includes a number of values that 
would count as interests in security, but none that would count as 
privacy interests not ultimately derivable from some other interest on the 
list.  My interest in security includes, as I have mentioned, my interest in 
life, my interest in living in a stable community that extends beyond the 
boundaries of the nuclear family, and my interest in ensuring that I am 
able to provide for my basic needs—which is secured by a protected 
interest in property. 
But nowhere in the list does anything that would count as an interest 
in informational privacy appear; informational privacy might be necessary 
in varying degrees in different cultures as a means to achieving some of 
the basic goods, but its value, if Finnis is correct, is instrumental, rather 
than intrinsic.  This, of course, does not imply that it receives no protection 
from morality; as noted above, what is a necessary means to an end that 
receives moral protection is something that also receives moral protection, 
 28. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 83 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1980). 




but it is of less importance from the standpoint of morality than the 
intrinsically valuable good it is essential to achieve. 
Of course, one need not take Finnis as having gotten his list correct, 
but it is noteworthy that theorists who attempt to justify privacy protection 
in virtue of its value converge on characterizing its value, though not 
necessarily explicitly, as wholly instrumental.  Charles Fried characterizes 
the value of privacy in terms of its value in facilitating intimate 
relationships; the value of privacy is a means to the intrinsic goods of 
personal intimacy.29  Edward Bloustein argues that informational privacy is 
valuable as a means of protecting autonomy and one’s sense of self as 
deserving of respect.30  James Rachels argues that informational privacy 
protects against a number of harms and discriminatory behaviors as well 
as helps us control our social relationships with others.31 
To my knowledge, no author has made a plausible case that any 
element of informational privacy is intrinsically valuable or counts as a 
basic constituent of human well-being or flourishing.  If privacy is purely 
instrumentally valuable as a means to secure other goods, including 
security, that are intrinsically valuable and are constitutive of human 
well-being and flourishing, then it is reasonable to conclude that privacy 
is less important, from the standpoint of morality, than security. 
VII.  CLASSICAL SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORIES 
A “classical” social contract theory is one that grounds the beginnings 
of an account of coercive state authority in an agreement that is actual in 
the sense that every party to the agreement has either expressly promised 
to be bound by the authority or done something that justifies attributing 
a promise to that party; in the latter case, the promise is said to be “tacit” 
or “implied.”  Social contract theories that take this approach tend to 
be “classical” in the more intuitive sense that they are, as a historical 
matter, the earliest version of the theories, which also correctly suggests 
that the approach of social contract theories has changed over time.  I 
take the social contract theories of Hobbes and Locke, while differing in 
many respects, to be paradigmatic examples of classical social contract 
theories. 
 29. CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 140–44 (1970). 
 30. Bloustein, supra note 13, at 1000, 1002, 1006. 
 31. Rachels, supra note 15, at 323–26. 
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A.  The Structure of Classical Social Contract Theories 
Classical social contract theories begin with the postulation of a 
mythical presocial state, called the state of nature in which the goods 
that are needed to satisfy basic needs are insufficient to satisfy the needs 
of persons in that state.  In the state of nature, there are none of the 
benefits associated with our living together cooperatively in a society of 
even the smallest scale. 
To begin, there is no central authority of any kind, such as a state, to 
coercively enforce rules that limit behavior in the state of nature.  There 
is hence nothing in the state of nature, other than a person’s own efforts, 
to protect him or her from being victimized by other people.  The only 
limits on the behavior of other persons towards any particular citizen are 
that citizen’s ability to fend off physical attacks and other sorts of 
assaults on other interests he or she might have—such as an interest in 
food he or she has gathered. 
In consequence, there are no binding social bonds or agreements 
possible.  In the state of nature, it is always in an agent’s interest to cheat 
on an agreement or promise—regardless of whether the other parties 
cheat.  If the other parties cheat, the agent must cheat simply to keep up.  
If the other parties do not cheat, the agent can gain an unbargained-for 
advantage by cheating.  Since this is known to all in the state of nature, 
cooperative arrangements are not possible. 
This means that, in the state of nature, one has no friends, no relatives, 
and no family ties—nothing in the state of nature that would constitute 
the kind of social bond that makes possible mutual trust between 
individuals or even unilateral trust of one person in another person.  
Thus, there is nothing in the state of nature that would make cooperative 
behavior, or teamwork, possible.  One is completely on one’s own in the 
state of nature; and since trust is not possible, one must constantly be on 
guard against threats from other inhabitants. 
Accordingly, there are none of the benefits that social cooperation 
makes possible in the state of nature.  There is no art or entertainment, of 
course.  But, more importantly, there is no technology of any kind that 
would enable one to make certain tasks easier, increase one’s productivity, 
or increase the stock of material resources available to one in the state of 
nature.  In the state of nature, one does have one’s wits to rely on; after 
all, human beings remain rational in the sense of having certain problem-
solving abilities that rely on conscious deliberation.  But what a person 




will be able to do with her wits will be severely limited by the fact that 
there is no history of trial and error, no science, and no education to 
provide persons in the state of nature with any information from other 
people they can work with.  Presumably, one’s rational capacities in the 
state of nature will be limited to enabling people to make fairly primitive 
tools and weapons. 
Material resources in the state of nature are extremely scarce in the 
following sense.  There is simply not enough of what human beings need 
to survive to enable all persons in the state of nature to live a lifespan 
that comes close to the average lifespan in the United States.  Some will 
die more quickly than others, but nearly all will die long before reaching 
an age we in the twenty-first century take for granted as a probable 
lifespan. 
Taken together, these conditions ensure that life in the state of nature 
will be violently competitive and, for that reason, extremely unpleasant.  
It is not just a matter of everyone’s having to scratch out for themselves 
the minimum resources needed to survive; one will have to engage in 
some sort of fight or conflict with others to do this because resources are 
so scarce.  Here is how Hobbes famously describes life in the state of 
nature: 
   Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power 
to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and 
such a warre, as is of every man against every man. . . . 
   Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is 
Enemy to every man; the same consequent to the time, wherein men live 
without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention 
shall furnish them withall.  In such condition, there is no place for Industry; 
because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; 
no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no 
commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as 
require much force; No knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; 
no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continual feare, and 
danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short.32 
This terrible state of war of all against all that constitutes the state of 
nature, as Hobbes describes it, is the alternative to life under some sort 
of common authority with the ability to coercively enforce rules to 
protect people against violence, theft, and other infringements of important 
interests. 
Hobbes and Locke, the first classical social contract theorists, differed 
on whether morality governs life in the state of nature—Hobbes taking 
the counterintuitive position that everything is permissible there; but 
 32. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 88–89 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1991) (1660). 
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they clearly agreed that life in a state of nature is sufficiently unpleasant 
that any practically rational person will want out and be willing to 
sacrifice some measure of autonomy to a state in exchange for a similar 
sacrifice on the part of all others.  While Hobbes believed this meant that 
people voluntarily submit to the authority of a sovereign whose authority 
is unlimited in the sense that the sovereign can commit no moral wrong 
against its subjects, Locke believed that people voluntarily submit to a 
state authority that enacts laws through democratic procedures while 
simultaneously respecting the natural moral rights to life, liberty, and 
property that persons have even in the state of nature.33  Either way, 
people are plausibly presumed to actually agree to be bound by the 
common authority as a way of escaping the state of nature, which both 
theorists believe is the only alternative to life in a society governed by a 
sovereign entity of some kind with coercive authority. 
B.  Security vs. Privacy in Classical Social Contract Theories 
It is clear that the primary motivation in the state of nature for submitting 
to a coercive state authority is to escape the extreme unpleasantness 
associated with life in that state.  One’s physical security is always in 
danger in the state of nature; one’s life is always in danger—whether 
directly or indirectly.  One must, most obviously, be on guard against 
threats of deadly physical violence; the price of failure to be sufficiently 
vigilant will frequently be grievous bodily injury or death.  Less obviously, 
one must guard against having one’s few possessions taken by other 
persons. 
Indeed, while Hobbes was pretty explicit that the very point of 
submitting to the sovereign was to gain some measure of physical 
security by giving up the unlimited freedom one has in the state of 
nature, Locke believed that the very point of the state authority is to 
protect property.  Although it may therefore seem that Locke and Hobbes 
disagree about the basic value that people submit to authority to achieve, 
the appearance is misleading.  Locke presumably believes that in the 
state of nature the principal threat to security consists in the threat of 
having one’s few possessions taken, assuming that the extreme scarcity 
of the state of nature presents the primary threat to security against 
which people have to guard. 
 33. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 330–33 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 




This is, in part, what explains a number of features of Locke’s famous 
argument for natural property rights.  First, Locke argues, in effect, that 
people need to consume material objects in the commons to survive and 
that the moral right of self-preservation ensures that there must be some 
morally justified way to take things out of the state of nature and 
appropriate them.  Locke argued that we can acquire a property right in 
an unowned object by mixing something to which we have a property 
right—our labor—with that object in a way that creates new value.  But 
that is simply the mechanism Locke identifies as acquiring a moral 
property right in something, which he has antecedently concluded must 
exist as a consequence of our right to preserve our lives—and the 
reasoning is compelling: if we have a moral right to Y, and X is a necessary 
means to Y, then we have a moral right to X.34  The very foundation of 
Locke’s argument for natural property rights is grounded in an interest in 
the preservation of one’s life that is central to the notion of security. 
Second, the compelling importance of the interest in security explains 
one of the limitations on the natural property rights that the state is 
morally obligated to protect.  Locke famously limited the capacity to 
acquire property rights in the state of nature to objects that belong to no 
one—“original acquisition”—by two provisos, one more telling than the 
other, for our purposes.  The less relevant proviso is that one can never 
acquire an object for the purpose of destroying or wasting it, which is 
intended to try to preserve the stock of scarce resources as much as 
possible.  The more relevant proviso is that one can acquire a property 
right in an otherwise unowned material object only if there was enough 
of that object of similar quality left for everyone else.  The idea here is 
that original acquisition in these circumstances does not exacerbate the 
conditions of scarcity that are likely to promote violent conflict among 
persons; as Locke puts the point: 
No Body could think himself injur’d by the drinking of another Man, though he 
took a good Draught, who had a whole River of the same Water left him to 
quench his thirst.  And the Case of Land and Water, where there is enough of 
both, is perfectly the same.35 
Accordingly, the state’s most important obligation is to protect 
property, on Locke’s view, precisely because the protection of property 
will ensure the public peace and minimize threats to physical security.  
Protection of property, though first among the state’s priorities, is a 
 34. It seems clear that people have a moral right to consume what they need to 
survive if it does not belong to anyone else.  But this gets us, at most, the existence of 
moral property rights in objects needed to survive; it would not justify a moral right to 
accumulate the amounts of property currently held by the world’s richest persons. 
 35. LOCKE, supra note 33, at 291. 
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means to the ultimate end of protecting security by ending the war of all 
against all that occurs in the state of nature.  For classical social contract 
theorists, then, the most important value that submission to state authority is 
intended to pursue is security. 
It follows, of course, that whatever the rest of the hierarchy of values 
might look like, the value of privacy is less, according to classical social 
contract theories, than the value of security.  The rights to life and 
freedom from intentionally inflicted grievous physical injury trump the 
right to privacy, if such there be, when the latter comes into direct 
conflict with the former.  Of course, Locke would rank the right of property 
alongside the other rights or interests mentioned above as constituting 
the right or interest in security because he believes protection of property 
is so important to protection of security.  But classical social contract 
theories all converge in implying (1) that the right or interest in privacy 
is not absolute; and (2) that the right or interest in security trumps the 
right or interest in privacy when the two come into direct conflict—
though neither theory tells us much about how or when these interests 
might directly conflict. 
VIII.  CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORIES 
A.  John Rawls’s Justice as Fairness 
Perhaps the most fundamental idea in John Rawls’s famous theory of 
justice as fairness is “the idea of a society as a fair system of social 
cooperation over time from one generation to the next.”36  Implicit in the 
claim that society is a fair system of cooperation, as Rawls understands 
that claim, are two further claims: (1) the terms that govern societal 
cooperation ought to be reasonably acceptable to each participant; 
and (2) those terms ought to be reasonable from the standpoint of the 
participant’s own prudential interests.37  Accordingly, Rawls attempts to 
identify the fair terms of cooperation by means of a hypothetical agreement 
among rational participants: the principles of justice constraining the 
state’s lawmaking activities are, on his view, those that would be chosen 
by rational persons in an “original position.”38 
 36. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS 5 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001). 
 37. Id. at 6. 
 38. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 15–19 (rev. ed. 1999). 




The crucial idea of the original position is defined by three elements of 
normative theoretical importance.  First, persons in the original position 
must be free and equal so as to preclude any unfair bargaining advantages 
among the parties.  As Rawls points out, “[I]f it is to be a valid agreement 
from the point of view of political justice[,] . . . these conditions must 
situate free and equal persons fairly and must not permit some to have 
unfair bargaining advantages over others.”39 
Second, persons in the original position are assumed to be concerned 
only to maximize their own interests, and are not assumed to take an 
interest in the welfare of other persons.40  The reason for this is that the 
most that can be assumed about the motivations of any human being is 
that she is motivated by her own prudential interests.  While many human 
beings are motivated by altruistic considerations, not everyone is.  To 
ensure that the principles chosen by persons in the original position are 
universally acceptable, Rawls defines the original position in such a way 
that the only psychological assumptions on which it depends are true of 
every human being. 
Third, and most importantly, persons in the original position are 
shielded from information about their own contingent abilities and 
circumstances by the so-called veil of ignorance.41  Persons behind the 
veil of ignorance do not know, for example, how smart, athletic, physically 
attractive, socially adept, wealthy, or healthy they are.  As Rawls describes 
this feature of the original position: 
[N]o one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does 
he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his 
intelligence and strength, and the like.  Nor, again, does anyone know his conception 
of the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the special 
features of his psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or 
pessimism.  More than this, I assume that the parties do not know the particular 
circumstances of their own society.  That is, they do not know its economic or 
political situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has been able to 
achieve.  The persons in the original position have no information as to which 
generation they belong.42 
A person in the original position, then, knows nothing about the abilities 
and properties that distinguish her from other people.  In effect, such a 
person knows no more about herself than she does about any other 
person; what knowledge she has about herself is limited to knowledge of 
those properties that she shares with every other person. 
 39. RAWLS, supra note 36, at 15. 
 40. RAWLS, supra note 38, at 10. 
 41. Id. at 11. 
 42. Id. at 118. 
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There are two points worth making about the original position.  First, 
it should be clear that the original position in Rawls’s theory does the 
work of the state of nature in the classical social contact theories.  The 
veil of ignorance forces a person to make a choice; and it should be clear 
that one of the relevant factors in making the choice will be to avoid 
some of the extreme unpleasantness associated with the state of nature.  
Second, the point of the veil of ignorance is to seal off information that 
is irrelevant as far as justice is concerned.43  Although the principles of 
justice are chosen by rational agents concerned only to advance their 
own interests, they must make their choices only on the basis of information 
that is morally relevant.  Information about a person’s intellectual abilities is 
morally irrelevant because those abilities depend largely on circumstances 
over which she has little control: who her parents are, where she was 
born, and how much education she has are largely matters of luck.  
While such fortuitous circumstances are, of course, relevant with respect 
to one’s prudential deliberations, they are irrelevant with respect to 
one’s moral deliberations—and the choice of principles of justice is 
ultimately a moral choice.  Accordingly, persons in the original position 
must choose principles that will advance their interests no matter what 
abilities and propensities they turn out to have. 
The imposition of the veil of ignorance prevents persons in the 
original position from adopting an interest-maximizing principle for 
pursuing their prudential interests.  In conditions of full information, 
a rationally self-interested agent can pursue a strategy that aims at 
maximizing her own utility.  In particular, such an agent can assess the 
expected value of each act A by calculating the differential between the 
expected benefit of A—that is, the magnitude of the benefit associated 
 43. As Rawls puts this important point: 
[I]t seems reasonable and generally acceptable that no one should be advantaged or 
disadvantaged by natural fortune or social circumstances in the choice of 
principles.  It also seems widely agreed that it should be impossible to tailor 
principles to the circumstances of one’s own case.  We should insure further that 
particular inclinations and aspirations, and persons’ conceptions of their good 
do not affect the principles adopted.  The aim is to rule out those principles that 
it would be rational to propose for acceptance, however little the chance of 
success, only if one knew certain things that are irrelevant from the standpoint 
of justice.   For example, if a man knew that he was wealthy, he might find it 
rational to advance the principle that various taxes for welfare measures be 
counted unjust; if he knew that he was poor, he would most likely propose the 
contrary principle. 
Id. at 16–17. 




with A multiplied by its probability, and the expected cost of A—that is, 
the magnitude of the cost associated with A multiplied by its probability, 
and select the act with the highest expected value.44  By selecting the act 
with the highest expected value, the agent optimizes her prospects for 
maximizing her own utility. 
In conditions of highly restricted information, however, rationally self-
interested agents must adopt a more conservative “maximin” strategy and 
choose behaviors that are minimally necessary to protect themselves against 
highly undesirable outcomes.  As Rawls describes it, the maximin strategy 
“tells us to identify the worst outcome of each available alternative and then 
to adopt the alternative whose worst outcome is better than the worst 
outcomes of all the other alternatives.”45  The maximin rule, unlike the 
ordinary prudential strategy of maximizing expected value, takes only 
into account the relative magnitude of the worst possible outcomes; it 
does not take into account any information that assesses the comparative 
probabilities of the various options because such information is not 
available.  In effect, then, rationally self-interested agents deploy the 
maximin strategy as a means for avoiding the most unacceptable of 
undesirable outcomes. 
While some authors argue that the maximin strategy is not the only 
rational strategy applicable in situations of high risk and uncertainty,46 it 
should be clear that something very like the maximin strategy is rationally 
deployed in such situations.  A somewhat perverse example is helpful in 
illustrating the point.  From the standpoint of prudential rationality 
alone,47 it is rational for someone with full information to play the most 
dangerous games if the prize is large enough and the odds of losing are 
remote enough.  Whether it is prudentially rational, for example, to play 
 44. While agents do not typically ground their behaviors in explicit mathematical 
calculations of probability, this is true for a variety of reasons that do not call the general 
principle into question.  First, in most instances, the relevant probabilities are known to 
be one.  For example, the probability of the only material cost of a candy bar—its 
price—is one.  Second, in circumstances in which the material probabilities are not 
known to be one, the agent has only a rough feel for the relevant values.  In such 
situations, the role that explicit calculations normally play is played by a rough intuitive 
process of weighing the outcomes. 
 45. RAWLS, supra note 36, at 97. 
 46. See, e.g., John C. Harsanyi, Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for 
Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’s Theory, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 594, 598 (1975) 
(reviewing RAWLS, supra note 38). 
 47. The standpoint of prudential rationality seeks nothing more than the maximization 
of one’s own interests.  While it is probably true that a purely prudential standpoint is 
rarely appropriate, it is crucial to realize here that moral considerations are not relevant 
with respect to making purely prudential decisions.  Accordingly, the following example 
brackets any considerations of morality, which would function to deter the agent from 
playing the game.  The only issue in deciding whether or not to play is whether doing so 
maximally conduces to one’s self-interest. 
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a game of Russian roulette with one bullet depends on the amount of the 
prize and on the number of empty chambers in the gun.  While it would 
clearly be irrational to play if I know the prize is $1 and there is only one 
empty chamber in the gun, it is clearly rational to play if I know the 
prize is $100 million and there are six billion empty chambers;48 one 
incurs a substantially greater risk of death every time one gets into 
an automobile.  In these cases, there is sufficient information to adopt an 
interest-maximizing strategy that will sometimes dictate playing the game.  
However, a more conservative maximin strategy is appropriate from the 
standpoint of prudential rationality if I lack information about some of the 
salient probabilities.  For example, if I am not told how many empty 
chambers there are in the gun, it is clearly rational to adopt a maximin 
strategy that requires me to decline the game as a means of avoiding the 
worst of undesirable outcomes. 
Although the motivation for the veil of ignorance is largely moral, its 
effect on the deliberations of agents in the original position is prudential 
in character.  Since the veil of ignorance denies people any information 
about themselves that would tell them how likely they are to win or lose 
in society, they must adopt a more conservative prudential strategy for 
selecting the principles of justice than the interest-maximizing strategy 
that is available in conditions of full information.  They must, as a matter 
of prudential rationality, choose those principles that are minimally necessary 
to enable them to avoid the very worst outcomes.  Since a maximin strategy 
will enable them to do this, it is rationally deployed by agents in the 
original position. 
Rawls believes that a person in the original position will avoid the 
very worst outcomes by choosing a principle that affords her maximum 
liberty compatible with everyone else’s having comparable liberty and a 
principle that assures that economic inequalities will conduce to her 
benefit no matter where she winds up in society.  According to the Liberty 
Principle, “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive 
scheme of basic liberty compatible with a similar scheme of liberty for 
 48. This is subject to one qualification: if one believes that God exists and 
punishes suicide with eternal and infinite suffering in hell, then the expected cost of the 
game is infinite no matter how small the probability of losing.  Since a finite expected 
benefit is infinitesimally small relative to an infinite expected cost, it is irrational to play 
the game on such theistic assumptions no matter how big the prize and how small the 
probabilities of losing. 




others.”49  According to the Difference Principle, “social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected 
to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices 
open to all.”50  The person in the original position thus uses a maximin 
strategy to enable her to avoid catastrophic situations in which her freedom 
is denied or in which economic inequalities are permitted at her expense. 
Here it is essential to consider some of the catastrophic situations that 
the two principles of justice are chosen to avoid.  The Liberty Principle, 
which allows the maximum freedom to each compatible with similar 
freedom for all, takes directly into account the consequences to physical 
security of allowing people to do whatever they feel like doing.  Utterly 
unrestricted freedom is likely to lead people to resolve conflicts of 
interests by violent behaviors—violence being an obvious threat to physical 
security.  The Difference Principle seeks to protect people from the effects 
of life-threatening poverty when there are more than enough resources to 
satisfy everyone’s basic needs, which is likely to result in violent conflicts.  
The concern here is to avoid the catastrophic consequences associated with 
debilitating illness, injury, or disability that prevent a person from 
providing for her own needs.  These are clearly provisions and concerns 
that are intended to protect people from threats to life and from threats of 
grievous bodily injury or debilitating disease and disability, which fall within, 
if not the province of, physical security—something closely related. 
It should be noted that nothing in these principles necessarily protects 
any of the privacy interests that are typically protected by privacy rights.  
Of course, in some cases, one might argue that protection of privacy is 
necessary to ensure the full exercise of liberty rights, but these are two 
different issues that are only contingently related; after all, the value of 
privacy is not one accepted universally among cultures, and what is 
considered private varies from culture to culture depending on other 
contingent features that vary with culture.  As was the case with the classical 
theories, the right to, or moral interest in, privacy is not absolute and 
must clearly sometimes yield to protection of physical security. 
Rawls’s theory is sometimes treated as though one must test the 
legitimacy of every proposed law by subjecting it to analysis from the 
original position—something I doubt to be correct; but if this is the 
correct interpretation, no practically rational self-interested agent would 
choose a principle making the interest in privacy absolute. 
The following is an easy way to see this: suppose we were considering 
a law that made it possible for the state to combat terrorism by obtaining 
the library records of patrons meeting a certain description without 
 49. RAWLS, supra note 38, at 53. 
 50. Id. 
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disclosing to patrons that their records have been disclosed.  What would 
someone in the original position say about this?  It depends on how 
much more we assume about its efficacy.  If, for example, the law would 
save one hundred thousand lives while slightly changing the reading 
habits of just one person, it would be irrational not to accept the act.  
However, if the act would prevent just one broken arm while severely 
changing the reading habits of millions of people, then it would probably 
be irrational to accept the act.  From the original position, the act’s 
legitimacy turns largely on the effects it will have on both security and 
speech—issues that are empirical in character.  Because we do not know 
from the original position exactly what the facts are with respect to the 
relevant numbers, we will, in adopting the maximin perspective, seek to 
choose the rule with the most acceptable of the worst outcomes.  In other 
words, we will choose to allow the state to combat terrorism this way 
because, from a position of highly limited information, the worst possible 
outcome of adopting the rule is better than the worst possible outcome of 
not adopting the rule: changing the reading habits of millions without 
saving any lives is preferable to the number of lives that might be lost in 
a worst-case scenario if the rule is not adopted. 
From our current vantage point in combating terrorism, of course, this 
sort of provision, which mirrors one in the USA PATRIOT Act,51 is 
clearly not justifiably adopted.  The problem is that, given our particular 
experience with terrorists, we have enough information to be justified in 
believing that a rule like this is not likely to achieve its purposes since 
we have good reason to believe terrorists are not likely to seek out 
information in a way easily traced to them.  The issue, however, is what 
would we say when we lack sufficient information to estimate the expected 
costs and benefits of such a provision.  Because we have adopted something 
like a maximin perspective from this position, we would adopt a presumption 
in favor of what we rationally take to be the most important value from a 
self-interested perspective.  From the standpoint of self-interest, most 
people will share the intuition that security is more important than 
privacy and make a presumption in favor of the act given its purpose. 
Accordingly, in the absence of any information that would enable us 
to predict the efficacy of such a restriction on privacy, the worst-case 
scenario that the maximin strategy forces us to reject is being killed by 
terrorists.  The worst-case scenario with respect to privacy is that the 
 51. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (Supp. IV 2004). 




state learns we are reading something that is really embarrassing.  On the 
assumption that we cannot estimate the probabilities from the original 
position, we choose what seems to us from a position of much greater 
information one of the most knuckleheaded provisions of the PATRIOT 
Act. 
In closing this subpart, it is worth noting one conspicuous difference 
between classical social contract theories and Rawls’s contract theory.  
The former relies on the idea that people actually consent to the social 
contract that establishes the state authority, whereas the latter relies on 
the weaker idea that people in the original position would consent to the 
two principles of justice if they were in a position that they are clearly 
not in.  Otherwise put, the classical theories rely on actual consent, 
whereas Rawls relies on hypothetical consent.  Something like this, 
as we will see, will turn out to be true of Robert Nozick’s version of 
contract theory. 
B.  Robert Nozick’s Deontological Libertarianism 
Classical social contract theories of legitimacy begin with the mythical 
state of nature—a presocietal state that is the alternative to life in society 
under a central lawmaking authority.  The state of nature, as we have seen, 
offers none of the benefits of society: no technology, no art, no communion 
with other people, and no family.  Because life in the state of nature is a 
“Warre of everyone against everyone”52 and is “nasty, brutish, and short,”53 
classical social contract theories infer that people either explicitly or 
impliedly consent to the authority of the state as a means of avoiding 
such a bad life.  Since any social arrangement, and hence any state, is 
preferable to the state of nature, the state can be presumed legitimate as 
something to which citizens actually or impliedly promise obedience. 
Nozick believes there are at least two problems with this strategy.  
First, it assumes that people would always behave very badly towards 
one another.  Indeed, this comes close to assuming that people are inherently 
violent and bad.  If the intrinsic goodness of people cannot confidently 
be assumed, neither can the intrinsic badness of people.  Second, it assumes 
that there could not be a state that is worse than the state of nature.  As 
Nozick points out, there are some possible states so bad, so oppressive, 
that even the state of nature would win.  I would rather live in the state 
of nature than be subject to state-sponsored torture. 
Accordingly, Nozick begins from a more modest assumption.  He 
focuses on what he thinks is the best anarchic alternative to the state.  In 
 52. HOBBES, supra note 32, at 91. 
 53. Id. at 89. 
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particular, he focuses upon a presocial situation in which people generally, 
though not always, satisfy moral constraints, and generally, though not 
always, act as they ought.  In such an anarchic situation, people do not 
always behave well, but they usually do.  According to Nozick: 
If one could show that the state would be superior even to this most favored 
situation of anarchy, the best that realistically can be hoped for, or would arise 
by a process involving no morally impermissible steps, or would be an 
improvement if it arose, this would provide a rationale for the state’s existence; 
it would justify the state.54 
In arguing for his libertarian theory of legitimacy, Nozick starts from 
certain Lockean assumptions about the state of nature and natural rights 
and by a series of steps that he takes to be inevitable, each one permissible 
under morality, shows that every rational person starting from the best 
possible anarchic situation would move to a situation with a minimal 
state—a minimal state being one that limits its coercive functions to 
protection of the moral rights to life, liberty, and property. 
It is important to realize that there are two major streams to the 
analysis—and both play a crucial role in justifying the general conclusion 
that the minimal state is morally legitimate.  The first is, of course, that 
each transition from anarchic existence to the minimal state is morally 
permissible.  The second is that each transition is inevitable given certain 
basic facts about human well-being and psychology.  Although it may 
appear less important, the second step is vital to the success of the argument.  
Nozick’s argument will justify only those states that arise out of such a 
series of transitions.  Nozick takes care of this problem by arguing that 
each step in the series is inevitable, given certain basic facts about 
human beings.  Because there is, in effect, no other way to get from the 
anarchic state of nature to the minimal state, the minimal state can be 
presumed legitimate no matter where it occurs.  For this reason, Nozick 
can validly draw the general conclusion that every minimal state is 
morally legitimate. 
Although Nozick regards the state of nature as more pleasant than 
Hobbes and Locke did, he also realizes that life in the state of nature 
remains both unpleasant and unstable; people may not always behave 
badly, but they frequently do enough to make the state of nature a 
condition people want to escape—and this, as a matter of practical rationality, 
requires some sort of response.  Initially, people deal with this difficulty 
 54. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 5 (1974). 




by forming groups devoted to the mutual protection of all their members, a 
response that is morally permissible under the natural law, since people 
have a right to form consensual associations, and also have the right to 
defend themselves and other persons. 
This will alleviate some of the difficulties associated with defending 
oneself, but Nozick argues such associations will have to be refined in 
certain ways.  First, everyone will always be “on call,” which involves 
tremendous inconvenience.  Second, it is not clear how protective associations 
will resolve conflicts between their members.  Third, it is not clear how 
to resolve disputes between members and nonmembers. 
Most importantly, problems are likely to arise as a number of protective 
associations arise in the same region and members of different protective 
associations begin to have conflicts.  While such problems are not likely 
to become serious when both associations agree on the disposition of the 
case, they can become serious when they disagree.  If one association wants 
to punish the member of another association that wants to protect its 
member, the two associations are likely to wage battles.  The eventual result 
of such battles will be that one protective association—a dominant 
protective association that will become a justified minimal state—will 
achieve ascendancy in the region, because opponents are either absorbed 
after defeat or move away.  As Nozick describes the situation: 
   In each of those cases, almost all the persons in a geographical area are under 
some common system that judges between their competing claims and enforces 
their rights.  Out of anarchy, pressed by spontaneous groupings, mutual-protection 
associations, divisions of labor, market pressures, economies of scale, and 
rational self-interest there arises something very much resembling a minimal 
state or a group of geographically distinct minimal states.55 
Whether the minimal state is morally legitimate, on Nozick’s view, will 
depend in part on whether or not it attempts in good faith to stay within 
the limits of the Lockean laws of nature.  If it systematically and intentionally 
aggresses against the natural rights of others, then it will not be 
legitimate; it will be an “outlaw” association.  If, however, it makes it a 
point to respect the natural rights of persons and minimizes violations, it 
will be legitimate to that extent. 
As is true of classical social contract theory, the primary motivation 
for every rational being to move from a presocial state of nature to a 
society with a central authority is to achieve more security than is 
otherwise possible—even though Nozick’s conception of the state of 
nature is somewhat more benign than that of the classical theories.  
Moreover, the minimal state is subject to the constraints of the Lockean 
conception of morality, which takes the primary purpose of the state to 
 55. Id. at 16–17. 
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protect property—presumably because property is necessary to the 
survival of each person and is hence the most likely motivation for 
persons to threaten the security—and hence rights to life of others.  To 
prevent such conflicts, the state must be especially concerned with 
protecting the right to property, and hence, derivatively, the right to life. 
Although it is true that some privacy interests either fall within the 
ambit of liberty interests or are prerequisites for the meaningful exercise 
of liberty requirements—I am less likely to freely express my right to 
speech on the Internet if I feel that my movements and anonymity are 
tracked and compromised—it is crucial to note that Nozick’s theory of 
the legitimate minimal state, as is true of every other theory we have 
considered, does not expressly name privacy as an interest or right that 
the minimal state is morally required to protect as a precondition of its 
legitimacy. 
This suggests that, for Nozick’s theory as for each other theory we 
have considered, security is the most important value.  Although there is 
no talk of a “right” to security, security provides the morally legitimate 
motive for making the various transitions that move each rational person 
from a presocial state of nature to life under a society with a coercive 
and centralized state authority.  This entails that security is the ultimate 
value that the state is morally obligated to protect and that when legitimate 
security interests directly conflict with legitimate privacy interests of 
comparable importance, the former trump the latter.  Thus, for Nozick, 
as with every other theorist we have considered, if there is a privacy 
right, it is far from being absolute. 
IX.  UTILITARIAN THEORIES OF STATE LEGITIMACY 
According to utilitarianism, the moral value of any act is fully 
determined by its effect on net aggregate utility among members of the 
community.56  Utilitarian moral theories posit a particular state of affairs 
as objectively good—the maximization of aggregate utility—and define 
 56. Utility is usually defined in subjective terms of happiness, pleasure, or satisfied 
preferences.  See WILLIAM L. REESE, DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION 601 
(1980).  This creates epistemic difficulties in evaluating acts under utilitarianism: how 
does one go about measuring someone’s happiness and comparing it to someone else’s 
happiness.  Welfarist conceptions frequently take an objective conception of human 
flourishing as the index for utility, easing the epistemic difficulties somewhat, but at the 
expense of a new difficulty—namely, identifying the objective measures of well-being.  
See 9 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 702–04 (Edward Craig ed., 1998). 




an act as morally right to the extent that it promotes this favored state of 
affairs—to the extent that it promotes aggregate utility—and morally 
wrong to the extent that it fails to promote this favored state of affairs.  
Since an act’s effect on utility is an extrinsic feature of the act,57 utilitarian 
theories presuppose that the moral quality of an act does not depend on 
its intrinsic, or inherent, features, and hence that no act is inherently 
good or inherently bad.  Acts are good or bad only insofar as they conduce 
or fail to conduce to the utility of members in the community.58 
As a general moral theory, utilitarianism applies both to acts of 
individuals and to acts of the state.  Applied to the state, it implies that 
the state’s lawmaking authority is constrained by a duty to enact laws 
that maximally promote aggregate community utility.  As political theorist 
Henry Sidgwick puts the point: 
[T]he true standard and criterion by which right legislation is to be distinguished 
from wrong is conduciveness to the general “good” or “welfare.”  And probably 
the great majority of persons would agree to interpret the “good” or “welfare” 
of the community to mean, in the last analysis, the happiness of the individual 
human beings who compose the community; provided that we take into account 
not only the human beings who are actually living but those who are to live 
hereafter. . . .  Accordingly, . . . the happiness of the persons affected [is] the 
ultimate end and standard of right and wrong in determining the functions and 
constitution of government.59 
Utilitarian theories of legitimacy, then, assess acts of the state entirely in 
terms of whether they sufficiently conduce to the favored state of 
affairs—maximal promotion of utility among the citizenry.  The state’s 
sole obligation, on this view, is to act in ways that have the effect of 
maximally promoting net utility among its citizens.60 
 57. An act can have radically different consequences depending on the circumstances 
of its performance.  For example, whether the act of giving a medication to someone 
promotes utility depends on to whom the medication is given.  Whereas giving a cancer 
patient chemotherapy, which is highly toxic, can improve her utility, giving it to a 
healthy person can worsen her utility by increasing the probability that she develops 
certain kinds of cancer in the long term. 
 58. This distinguishes consequentialist theories like utilitarianism from deontological 
theories, which assert that the moral quality of some acts is determined entirely by their 
intrinsic features.  On this view, for example, lying is intrinsically wrong—and hence 
wrong regardless of whether it happens to promote community utility. 
 59. Henry Sidgwick, Utility and Government, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
35, 35 (George Sher & Baruch A. Brody eds., 1999). 
 60. John Stuart Mill argued that considerations of utility justified the general 
principle that the state can legitimately prohibit only those acts that are harmful to others.  
On Mill’s view, utility is most likely to be maximized in a society where people are free 
to develop and act on their own conceptions of the good; people who are allowed to 
pursue their own values and plans are more likely to develop the sorts of skills and 
abilities that will make them useful to other people.  JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 
86–138 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859) [hereinafter 
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It is commonly thought that utilitarian theories that evaluate acts in 
terms of total utility are inconsistent with the idea that individuals have 
any moral rights of the sort we commonly take for granted.  There are two 
related reasons for this.  First, it is easy to come up with counterexamples 
that seem to show that utilitarianism requires what we take to be the 
violation of any right.  For example, a doctor would be morally obligated 
under utilitarianism to painlessly kill a healthy but otherwise irreversibly 
depressed homeless person with no friends or family if necessary to 
harvest his organs to save the lives of several persons who contribute 
greatly to maximizing utility.  Second, as we saw earlier, the infringement 
of a right, as a conceptual matter and matter of substantive morality, 
cannot be justified by the consequences to public utility of doing so; 
similarly, Nozick speaks of side constraints as doing the same work.  
Rights, on this common conception, “trump” consequences.  The problem 
with utilitarian “rights” is that, as the counterexamples show, any interest 
we take to be covered by a right can be justifiably infringed if the 
consequences of doing so are favorable enough.  As far as moral rights 
are concerned, utilitarianism seems inconsistent with there being any. 
It is crucial to note, however, that the issue of whether the state should 
recognize and protect legal rights is an analytically distinct issue from 
the issue of whether there are any moral rights.  It might be that any 
failure on the part of the state to protect what we (mis)take—if act 
utilitarianism is true—to be foundational moral rights would result in the 
kind of social instability that is inconsistent with maximally promoting 
social utility.  If this turns out to be true, then the state will be obligated, 
under a utilitarian theory of legitimacy, to provide legal protection of 
rights to life, liberty, property, and presumably privacy—although these, 
strictly speaking, will not qualify as “moral” rights. 
Even so, it seems clear that privacy interests will generally receive 
lesser protection than security interests under such a theory.  If utility is 
defined subjectively, then it seems clear that this will be the case; many 
people in the former Soviet Union who are better off in terms of liberty, 
and possibly even income, have expressed preferences to return to the 
totalitarian regime precisely because they felt more secure under the 
protection of a police force that seemed to be everywhere.  This, of course, 
is not an obviously irrational preference if the intuitions I described at 
MILL, ON LIBERTY].  See J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Roger Crisp ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1998) (1861) for a general account of Mill’s utilitarianism. 
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the beginning of this essay are correct.  I would prefer physical security 
over just about any other right—with the possible exception of a certain 
affluent standard of living.  Indeed, despite all the hysteria in the United 
States about the violation of privacy rights by laws such as the USA 
PATRIOT Act, most people seem to be as happy, on any subjective 
measure, as always. 
If, on the other hand, utility is defined objectively in terms of well-
being, it seems clear that security is more important than privacy.  It 
seems very difficult to make the case that, as an objective matter, people 
are better off in terms of well-being if they sacrifice security, other 
things being equal, for privacy.  While privacy interests seem important 
in cultures like ours to well-being as an objective matter, it seems 
absolutely clear that security from death or grievous bodily injury is 
more important than privacy interests and will trump those interests in 
the event of a direct conflict, as I have defined that idea.  According to 
utilitarian theories of state legitimacy, then, it is reasonable to conclude 
that privacy interests or rights are not absolute. 
Again, the claim is not that any increase in security, no matter how 
small, is likely to offset any sacrifice in privacy, no matter how extensive.  
Doubts about the efficacy of a law in protecting security at the expense 
of privacy might have the effect of making people very unhappy even 
when these doubts are incorrect.  But, other things being equal, people 
will regard the most important security interests they have as being 
morally more important than the most important privacy interests they 
have, suggesting that security is more important than privacy on a subjective 
conception of utility; and, on an objective conception of flourishing and 
well-being, that seems straightforwardly correct.  Whether the utilitarian 
standard is defined in terms of subjective conceptions of happiness or 
pleasure, or whether it is defined in terms of objective conceptions of 
well-being and flourishing, a utilitarian theory of legitimacy seems 
clearly to afford more protection, other things being equal, to security 
interests than to privacy interests.  As I have put this idea elsewhere, 
security trumps privacy. 
X.  COMMUTARIAN THEORIES OF STATE LEGITIMACY 
A.  Commutarian Theories Generally 
There are a variety of different theories that fall within the rubric of 
commutarian justifications of state authority, but all begin by challenging an 
assumption, somewhat inaccurately attributed to all so-called liberal 
theories of legitimacy: the most important legitimate concern of the state 
is to protect individual rights and not to advance either (1) some notion 
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of the common good grounded in the moral importance of community; 
(2) a notion of the common good that is not simply aggregative of 
individual goods; or (3) a conception of the self as necessarily social in 
character.  On these views, the values of protecting individual autonomy 
and rights is the best, if not the only viable way, to promote something 
viably characterized as a “common” or “public” good. 
The commutarian positions range from descriptive claims grounded in 
history, sociology, and psychology that largely express Aristotle’s view 
of human beings as social animals rather than as atomistic centers of 
individual autonomy and choice and the implications of this conception 
for claims about human well-being and flourishing, to normative claims 
about the moral importance of preserving community and social order 
relative to the moral importance of encouraging autonomy by expanding 
the range of individual choices available to each individual.  Indeed, 
some commutarian claims are fairly grounded in meta-ethical claims 
about the inappropriateness of taking liberal assumptions about the 
individual as applying across all social contexts and cultures.  The 
appropriateness of democracy, for example, for a society has to be 
assessed against the cultural context and history of that society—a lesson 
that has been painfully confirmed by our unfortunate experience in Iraq 
where the attempt to forcefully replace Saddam Hussein with a 
democratic regime reflecting our liberal values threatens to degenerate 
into a civil war that is likely to consume that country for at least the next 
fifty years,61 but should have been learned from our experience with 
 61. As is so characteristic of the white Western world’s attempt to remake the 
world of darker peoples in its own image, the majority position in the United States is 
now simply to get out of Iraq, without any concern for the damage that we have caused 
by creating the conditions for a civil war that will tear Iraq apart, resulting in 
perhaps tens of thousands of innocent deaths.  The history of colonialism and rapid 
decolonization reflects this blithe unconcern with our sense of moral responsibility: we 
go in, assert dominion to take control of a nation’s resources; and then we bail out when 
things get rough, arbitrarily drawing boundaries that are oblivious to existing hostilities 
and tensions among social groups while simultaneously attempting to maintain control 
over the country’s resources.  Slavery provides another somewhat different example: 
after years of one of history’s worst injustices, the United States finally set the slaves 
free, but without providing them even one cent to compensate them for the profit they 
produced for white slaveowners and a growing agrarian economy and without putting 
them in a position to begin a meaningful and productive life as a U.S. citizen.  Indeed, 
the present value of the forced labor taken from slaves from 1620 to 1865 has been 
estimated to be—depending on what reasonable rate of interest is chosen—$1 trillion to 
$97 trillion.  See, e.g., Joe R. Feagin, Documenting the Costs of Slavery, Segregation, 




colonizing, decolonizing, and finally enslaving developing nations with 
loans tied to conditions that ultimately hurt those nations.  These loans 
usually do so by requiring the recipient nations to open vulnerable 
markets to Western industries while Western nations continue to protect 
vulnerable industries like agriculture against recipient nations, which are 
in a favorable condition to compete only with those latter industries.  
The result of such aid is that it winds up destroying the local competing 
industries and exacerbating the very conditions of poverty the loans were 
supposed to alleviate. 
Even at this high level of generality, it is easy to see that a commutarian 
agenda that values a common good independent of the aggregation of 
individual goods, constituted by opportunities for satisfied autonomous 
preferences, will entail the position that security, construed as a collective 
notion like a social order in which serious crime and violence is 
uncommon—rather than as an aggregation of individual rights to life, 
property, et cetera—is a more important moral value, other things being 
equal, than privacy.  If preserving the social values associated with 
community, or common good, is more important than individual rights, 
then it follows that security, properly construed, is more important than 
privacy in the sense that threats to security are more important from the 
standpoint of morality and deserve more legal protection than “comparable” 
threats to privacy, which is an interest that is unique to individuals and 
which reflects the individualism of neoliberal traditions. 
Again, this should not be thought to entail any sort of easy algorithm 
for deciding how to deal with apparent conflicts between security or 
privacy or any claim to the effect that any gain in security, no matter 
how small, justifies any sacrifice of privacy, no matter how large; the 
claim that security trumps privacy is compatible with a calculus of 
weighing competing privacy and security interests that is extremely 
complex and sometimes favors protecting privacy concerns over security 
interests if the former are substantial enough, and the latter trivial 
and Contemporary Racism: Why Reparations Are in Order for African Americans, 20 
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 49 (2004). 
At the upper end of the scale, this would require, if universal reparations were morally 
required, a payout of more than $300,000 for each black man, woman, and child in this 
country.  Of course, there is no guarantee that such value would have all been 
transmitted from one generation to the next, but I think it is clear that had slaves been 
fairly remunerated, we would not have the development of a permanent underclass of 
black citizens confined to terrible inner city neighborhoods. 
I simply cannot resist saying what is just not said enough: the behavior of the white 
Western world towards peoples of color has been, and continues to be, reprehensible.  
The United States, to my knowledge, has not even been able to bring itself to apologize 
for slavery—much less take effective measures to reduce the economic inequalities that 
have been transmitted from one generation of black persons to the next from the time of 
slavery! 
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enough, or if there is simply not enough of a causal connection between 
the restrictions on privacy and some meaningfully large gain in security.  
The notion of security includes individual rights to life and physical and 
financial security, but it is also a collective notion that includes the idea 
that social order and the preservation of community is a value protected 
by security that is independent and not merely aggregative of individual 
security rights—a component, that is, of a common good not constituted 
by the aggregation of individual goods of all persons in the social group.  
If this notion of a common good applies to all societies—and methodological 
commutarians need not take this position insofar as they merely reject 
the universal application of the liberal conception of self and value—
then it follows that security will, as I vaguely put it, trump privacy, and 
that privacy is not an absolute value because informational privacy is an 
individual interest, whereas security is an interest expressive of the 
common good. 
B.  Moderate Commutarianism, Security, and Privacy 
Nevertheless, there are a variety of different commutarian theories, 
and one of the most nuanced and subtle is Amitai Etzioni’s version of 
commutarianism.  Unlike other theorists who characterize themselves as 
commutarian, Etzioni does not absolutely privilege the common good 
over individual goods or individual choice.  On Etzioni’s view, the 
commutarian view recognizes that individual choice or autonomy and 
social order exist in a symbiotic relationship.  Too much freedom of 
choice, as arguably has happened in societies like the United States, and 
social order is threatened; too much social order, as arguably occurs in 
totalitarian societies like the former U.S.S.R., and individual autonomy 
is threatened.  As Etzioni deftly puts the point: 
   The commutarian paradigm, at least as advanced here, recognizes the need to 
nourish social attachments as part of the effort to maintain social order while 
ensuring that such attachments will not suppress all autonomous expressions.  
That is, a good society does not favor the social good over individual choices or 
vice versa; it favors societal formulations that serve the two dual social virtues 
[of collective order and individual rights] in careful equilibrium.62 
Etzioni, then, differs from liberals who take the position that individuals 
are atomistic entities with individual autonomy being the most important 
 62. AMITAI ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE: COMMUNITY AND MORALITY IN A 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 27 (1996). 




moral notion, and from social conservatives, and more extreme commutarians, 
who take the position that individual identity is constructed, in part, by 
the network of social relationships in which the individual stands and 
that social order is the most important balance.  For Etzioni, meaningful 
individual autonomy and meaningful social order cannot be considered 
apart from one another.  They must be weighed against each other to find 
the proper balance; Etzioni’s view is thus what I will call the “moderate” 
version of commutarianism, one that attempts to strike the proper 
balance between individual autonomy and social order. 
Etzioni attempts to articulate principles that indicate when the proper 
balance of privacy and social order is maintained—and it should be 
noted that these principles purport to address some of the epistemological 
principles I have indicated cannot be addressed in this essay.  First, as he 
puts it, “a well-balanced, commutanitarian society will take steps to limit 
privacy only if it faces a well-documented and macroscopic threat to the 
common good, not a merely a hypothetical danger.”63  He argues, for 
example, that HIV poses a well-documented and macroscopic threat to 
millions of lives that can be reduced by testing infants for HIV.64  
Second, officials should explore the possibility of effectively minimizing 
the threat to the common good without restricting privacy; if the risk can 
be minimized by less intrusive means, it should be done so.  Third, 
restrictions to privacy for the purpose of promoting the common good 
should be as minimally intrusive as possible.  Finally, officials should 
take steps to minimize undesirable side effects of restrictions on privacy. 
These are surely sensible principles, but they do not fully address the 
difficult epistemological questions I described above.  Distinguishing 
well-documented and macroscopic threats to the common good from 
merely hypothetical threats is easy at the margins, but prohibitively 
difficult with respect to certain measures of, say, the USA PATRIOT 
Act, which is intended to protect against terrorism.  Some probabilities 
are simply obvious, but those that are not resist accurate calculation 
because we lack an appropriate theory or algorithm for calculating them; 
much of the work here will be guesswork, and hence, highly speculative.  
Second, it will frequently not be clear whether a particular restriction on 
privacy will have the desired effect on promoting the social good or 
whether alternative restrictions will be equally effective.  But, more 
importantly, none of these principles tells us how to weigh the privacy 
interests of one possibly larger set of individuals against the security 
interests of a smaller set, or how to determine when a threat to social 
order is comparable to a threat to privacy relative to their respective 
 63. ETZIONI, supra note 1, at 12. 
 64. Id. at 17–42. 
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hierarchies.  Etzioni’s principles are, of course, useful in helping us to 
make such decisions, but the major epistemological issues that would 
have to be resolved to comprehensively address all the issues remain 
without solution. 
It is important to note that Etzioni sometimes talks in terms of 
balancing individual rights with the “common good” and sometimes in 
terms of balancing them with the need for “social order.”  These are two 
different notions that are themselves different from the notion of security.  
The common good is the weakest of the notions in the sense that it 
encompasses the broadest range of considerations.  For example, the 
common good is surely promoted by the existence of libraries and 
museums where people can read books and view art free of charge, but it 
is not clear that these institutions promote social order—much less 
security.  The notion of social order connotes a certain kind of functioning 
and cooperation among individuals that libraries and museums might, 
but need not, promote.  Institutional protections of contract rights, in 
contrast, promote social order—and hence also the common good—by 
providing a foundation for cooperative economic behavior to take place; 
civil laws protecting contracts enable people to buy and sell goods and 
services in an orderly way that is less likely to lead to breaches that 
might cause wholesale breakdowns in the kind of economic activity that 
enables societies to grow their stock of economic assets. 
The notion of security is somewhat narrower than the notion of social 
order.  Breakdowns in social order need not be so severe as to threaten a 
society’s collective security.  Increasing disagreement on important moral 
issues diminishes social order by making political discourse less civil 
and less likely to resolve these disputes, as conversations on talk radio 
shows at both ends of the political spectrum amply demonstrate.  But 
those disagreements need not rise to the level of something that threatens 
the kinds of interests in well-being implicated by the notion of security.  
A citywide riot involves both a breakdown in social order and a threat to 
security; a politically divided citizenry might diminish orderly functioning 
in various social domains, but it does not necessarily involve a threat to 
security.  Threats to security necessarily implicate the social order, as a 
conceptual matter, but they involve the gravest threats. 
The point here is that the idea that privacy and the common good or 
social order must be balanced does not involve denying the thesis of this 
essay—namely that, other things being equal, security trumps privacy.  
It might be true that social order might sometimes yield to privacy, but 
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the threats to the social order that rise to the level of threats to security 
always win in conflicts with privacy interests that are of comparable 
importance relative to the spectrum of privacy interests.  When we are 
talking about saving innocent human lives, the most private facts about 
innocent persons are just not that important; if it is true—and this is not 
true as often as conservative politicians believe—that disclosure of such 
facts will save those lives, then it seems clearly justified to infringe 
privacy interests—as long as people are protected from any adverse 
consequences of those disclosures. 
In any event, it is clear that even on Etzioni’s more moderate conception 
of commutarianism, privacy interests are not absolute and do not necessarily 
trump other interests.  Privacy must sometimes, even on the narrowest 
interpretation, yield to social order or the common good.  But once the 
relationship between the concepts of security, social order, and common 
good are made clear, it seems reasonable to think that threats to security 
will win in conflicts with threats to privacy interests that are of relatively 
comparable importance.  Our interests in those matters essential to physical 
survival and well-being, which are the subjects of our security interests, 
seem to be presumptively more important, as a general matter, than our 
interests in informational privacy.  Informational privacy might sometimes 
defeat considerations that promote the common good or social order, but 
not considerations that promote or protect what is absolutely essential to 
physical survival and well-being. 
XI.  SCANLON’S “CONTRACTUALISM” 
Thomas Scanlon is famous for developing an influential objectivist 
theory of morality that is fully grounded in the claim that morality 
provides reasons for action—and not in any sort of ontological account 
that attempts to identify real moral properties in the world.  Scanlon is 
thus a moral objectivist—that is, some moral principles are true independently 
of what any person, group of persons, or culture believe, accept, or 
practice, and not in virtue of custom or convention—but not a moral 
realist—that is, there are real moral properties out there forming part of 
the fabric of the universe that are the mind-independent truth-makers of 
moral principles. 
As is readily evident, moral realism implies moral objectivism, but if 
Scanlon is correct, moral objectivism does not imply moral realism.  As 
Scanlon puts this important point: 
If we could characterize the method of reasoning through which we arrive at 
judgments of right and wrong, . . . [n]o interesting question would remain about 
the ontology of morals . . . . 
   This is because, in contrast to everyday empirical judgments, scientific claims, 
and religious beliefs that involve claims about the origin and control of the 
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universe, the point of judgments of right and wrong is not to make claims about 
what the spatiotemporal world is like.  The point of such judgments is, rather, a 
practical one: they make claims about what we have reason to do.  Metaphysical 
questions about the subject matter of judgments of right and wrong are important 
only if answers to them are required in order to show how these judgments can 
have this practical significance.  It may be said that we need a metaphysical 
characterization of the subject matter of morality in order to establish that moral 
judgments are about something “real,” but it is worth asking what kind of reality 
is at issue and why it is something we should be worried about.65 
Scanlon takes the reason-giving force of moral judgments as basic—that 
is, as not being in need of theoretical explication—and as being 
fundamental to their objective quality, and not implying the existence of 
any sort of moral properties out there in the world picked out by the 
terms “right” and “wrong.”  The terms “right” and “wrong” simply indicate 
that we have a reason of a certain sort to perform, or refrain from 
performing certain actions. 
Scanlon explains the special reason-giving force of moral judgments 
in terms of justifying acts in a manner that no person could reasonably 
reject.  On this view, an act is wrong “if its performance under the 
circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the 
general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a 
basis for informed, unforced general agreement.”66  Although termed 
“contractualist,” the claim here is not that there is such agreement or 
even that all rational persons would come to agree on certain principles; 
rather the claim is that people who are concerned to adopt principles 
would converge on principles that no one who shares certain cultural 
assumptions could reasonably reject.  While there is no claim that everyone 
is concerned to adopt such principles—there are, of course, sociopaths 
who seem utterly unconcerned with that matter—he believes that someone 
who is not concerned to adopt principles governing the behavior of the 
relevant group is deficient in some sense analogous to the way in which 
someone who cares nothing about art is deficient. 
It is important to note here that the notion of reasonableness is 
different from the notion of rationality, and that the claim is not the 
Kantian claim that an act is wrong if it violates principles that no rational 
person can reject as defining an end in itself.  In contrast, Kant sought to 
derive moral principles from our nature as rational beings, holding that 
there are some ends, defined by “categorical imperatives,” that every 
 65. T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 2 (1998). 
 66. Id. at 153. 




rational being has in virtue of being rational regardless of her wants, 
desires, emotions, preferences, beliefs, or practices.  These ends are defined 
by moral rules that are categorical in the sense that they apply to persons 
regardless of such contingent mental states.67  For Kant, to act wrongly is 
for the agent to act irrationally in the narrow sense of acting inconsistently 
with her own ends, although these ends need not be consciously 
embraced by the agent because they are her ends in virtue of being 
rational, and not in virtue of any desires she has or choices she makes. 
Scanlon’s claim is rather that an act is wrong if it violates a principle 
that no person with the right kind of motivations could reasonably reject.  
The notion of reasonableness is, itself, a moral notion, reflecting a prior 
commitment to adopting standards of right and wrong—and possibly 
presupposing some very general standards governing reasonableness: 
When we say, in the course of an attempt to reach some collective decision, that 
a person is being unreasonable, what we often mean is that he or she is refusing 
to take other people’s interests into account.  What we are claiming is that there 
is reason to take these interests into account given the supposed aim of reaching 
agreement or finding a course of action that everyone will be happy with.68 
To reject something unreasonably seems to indicate a moral fault—
something akin to unfairness: you are asking me to participate in agreeing to 
certain rules governing our behavior towards others, but you are not 
taking my interests into account.  However, as Scanlon points out, it 
does not necessarily involve irrationality or incoherence: “the fault 
involved in failing to be moved by moral requirements does not seem to 
be a form of incoherence.”69 
Scanlon gives a number of examples of rules he believes could not be 
reasonably rejected by people motivated to reach an agreement on rules 
regulating the behavior of community members towards others in the 
community, and it would be instructive to consider one of them to see 
how this theory applies with respect to personal interests that fall within 
the rubric of security.  Scanlon goes into much more detail than is appropriate 
or needed for our purposes, but it is worth noting what he has to say 
about a moral principle manipulating persons to do things by getting 
them to believe that something will be done that benefits them if they do 
the thing that is being induced by manipulation.  Scanlon believes that 
we could not reasonably reject the following principle: 
 67. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 31–33 
(Allen W. Wood ed. & trans., 2002). 
 68. SCANLON, supra note 65, at 33. 
 69. Id. at 151. 
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Principle M: In the absence of special justification, it is not permissible for one 
person, A, in order to get another person, B, to do some act, X (which A wants 
B to do and which B is morally free to do or not do but would otherwise not 
do), to lead B to expect that if he or she does X then A will do Y (which B 
wants but believes that A will otherwise not do), when in fact A has no intention 
of doing Y if B does X, and A can reasonably foresee that B will suffer 
significant loss if he or she does X and A does not reciprocate by doing Y.70 
This principle protects persons from being induced by false expectations to 
do things they are not obligated to do, and would not otherwise do, but 
for the inducement of the false expectation. 
Scanlon, reasonably enough, argues that anyone who is motivated to 
agree upon a rule that governs the behavior of persons in a given community 
could not reasonably reject this principle: 
   I take this to be a valid moral principle.  Considering the matter from the point 
of view of potential victims of manipulation, there is a strong generic reason to 
want to be able to direct one’s efforts and resources toward aims one has chosen 
and not to have one’s planning co-opted in the way Principle M forbids whenever 
this suits someone else’s purposes.  So it would be reasonable to reject a 
principle offering any less protection against manipulation.  On the other side, 
the perfectly general generic reason for wanting to be able to manipulate others 
whenever it would be convenient to do so is not strong enough to make it 
unreasonable to insist on the protection that M provides.71 
Here it is important to note that the reasons against adoption of M are 
purely self-interested and will not be strong enough to outweigh the 
other reasons for M in persons who are motivated to reach agreement on 
rules governing the behavior of the group for the purposes of assigning 
praise, blame, reward, and punishment—which are, of course, moral 
motivations to begin with. 
It is easy to see how one would arrive through a contractualist analysis 
at moral principles protecting life, physical safety and health, liberty, 
property, and information privacy.  Given the obvious significance of our 
vulnerability to suffer injuries to these interests and the limited import of 
self-interested reasons in persons properly motivated to reach agreement, it 
would be unreasonable to reject not only principles protecting these 
interests, but also to reject principles that rank these principles according 
to the personal importance of the interests they protect.  Clearly, for 
example, it would be unreasonable to accept a principle that sacrifices 
the life of an innocent person in order to protect the information privacy 
 70. Id. at 298. 
 71. Id. at 298–99. 
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of another innocent person—no matter how intimate or embarrassing 
that piece of personal information might be.  Anyone properly motivated 
would make the call based on his own obvious assessment that his life 
means more to him than the privacy of any particular piece of information, 
and adopt an impersonal point of view that recognizes the comparative 
importance to others of those same interests. 
Similar things can be said about the interests in physical safety and 
health.  No reasonable person concerned to reach agreement on moral 
rules could reasonably reject a norm that ranks protection against serious 
threats to personal health and safety as outweighing comparable threats 
to information privacy.  My health and safety are more important to me 
than any embarrassing information that might be disclosed about me, 
and I may fairly presume that other persons will make the same valuations.  
Whatever idiosyncratic self-interest I might have in infringing someone’s 
physical safety and health to protect my personal privacy, my special 
concern in my own interests could not justify reasonably rejecting a 
principle that protects everyone’s physical safety and health, in part, 
because I would never accept any less protection of my own physical 
safety and health—and my interest in infringing such interests of other 
people is clearly unreasonable if I am antecedently concerned to reach 
agreement on some sort of principle regarding the protection of such 
interests. 
The same is obviously true of the collective goods that make up 
collective security.  My individual security, construed to include my interests 
in life, safety, health, and general well-being, are seriously threatened by 
threats to the collective security.  A riot or a war being waged in my 
neighborhood poses serious risks to me that I would not accept for the 
sake of information privacy and thus I could not reasonably reject a 
principle that sacrifices comparable interests in my information privacy 
to protect the collective security—regardless of the extent to which my 
own individual security is threatened.  A reasonable person motivated to 
reach agreement on such principles could not fail to realize that social 
insecurity that threatens her individual security interests outweighs, 
other things being equal, her interests in information privacy and would 
hence not be in position to reasonably reject principles that protect 
security over comparable threats to information privacy. 
Scanlon’s theory is not explicitly concerned with political morality, 
but its application to moral questions about what the state ought and 
ought not do is quite natural given that Scanlon views his theory as 
being the foundation for all moral duties and rights.  If contractualism is 
the foundation for all moral principles, then it is the foundation not only 
for moral principles governing individuals, but also for moral principles 
governing the behavior of collective social groups, like state agencies.  
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Therefore, it governs what states may do by way of enacting laws that 
protect the various security and privacy interests, as well as norms intended 
to resolve conflicts that arise among these interests.  If Scanlon’s theory 
is correct, it seems clear that, other things being equal, security trumps 
privacy when there are competing threats to commensurable values of 
security and privacy. 
XII.  NORMATIVE THEORIES OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Normative theories of the criminal and civil law attempt to state the 
conditions under which particular criminal and civil laws are morally 
legitimate in the sense that they may coercively restrict freedom; every 
law coercively restricts freedom to the extent that it is ultimately backed 
by the police power of the state either in the form of punishment or in 
the form of the contempt sanction, which empowers a court to incarcerate a 
party to a lawsuit until she complies with a court order—such as might 
occur in a civil suit for damages. 
These theories tend to assume that the content of the particular area of 
law is morally legitimate and attempt to explain that fact in terms of a 
moral principle that laws in that area satisfy more often than not.  For 
example, normative theories of the criminal law frequently focus on 
principles that indicate the law may prohibit behaviors that cause unjustified 
harm to others and even, in some cases, to oneself.  Thus, for example, 
laws prohibiting intentional killing of others are justified in virtue of 
satisfying something like Mill’s Harm Principle—though Mill limited 
his formulation of the Harm Principle to laws that prevent harm to 
others.72  On this view, behaviors that cause significant, unjustified harm 
can be criminalized, which means that those behaviors can be punished 
by fines, incarceration, and possibly execution.73 
Theories that justify the state’s authority in areas of civil law tend to 
be more specific, focusing on the content of a particular substantive area 
of law—rather than on a general capacity of the state to enact civil 
regulations on behavior.  For example, Charles Fried justifies the 
content of contract law by showing it coheres, for the most part, to 
 72. MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 60, at 80–81. 
 73. For a helpful summary of the various normative theories of punishment, see 
Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880 
(1991). 




uncontroversial moral principles governing promises.74  Jules Coleman 
justifies the content of tort law by showing it embodies a legitimate 
conception of corrective justice.75  Robert Nozick argues that property 
law is justified to the extent it coheres with moral principles that define a 
natural right to property, which includes the authority to freely alienate 
one’s interest in property by a variety of morally effective consensual 
mechanisms.76 
While there are a number of theories attempting to describe the conditions 
of procedural legitimacy, they have largely focused on the criminal 
context.  For example, these theories focus on the procedural rights that 
a criminal defendant should have, which include, but are not limited to, a 
right to a fair trial, a right to competent representation, a right to appeal, 
and a right to be acquitted if the evidence does not meet the “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” standard.  Normative theories of criminal procedure 
attempt to describe the principles that determine whether a trial is “fair,” 
representation is “competent,” and so on.  In contrast, theories that focus 
on access to the civil justice system have not received a great deal of 
attention.77 
On the assumption that the content of the criminal and civil law is 
generally justified, we have further reason to think that the right to 
privacy is not absolute and is not as important from the standpoint of 
morality than the rights to life, freedom from physical assaults, and 
freedom from property crimes that generally function to protect a more 
general right to security. 
There are several general points to be made here.  First, violations of 
those rights that protect security generally have both civil and criminal 
remedies.  For example, certain homicides are not only punishable by the 
criminal law, but also actionable under the civil law under such causes of 
action, such as wrongful death claims.  Physical assaults are both punishable 
under criminal law and actionable under the civil laws for compensatory 
damages.  Crimes against property, likewise, are actionable under both 
criminal and civil laws.  Although there are some infringements of privacy 
interests that are criminalized, such as laws prohibiting persons from 
looking into windows or laws prohibiting persons from taking videos 
or photographs, without consent, of people using public bathrooms, 
 74. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 
passim (1981). 
 75. JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST 
APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 1–63 (2001). 
 76. NOZICK, supra note 54, at 164–74. 
 77. One exception is Kenneth Einar Himma, Towards a Theory of Legitimate 
Access: Morally Legitimate Authority and the Right of Citizens to Access the Civil 
Justice System, 79 WASH. L. REV. 31 (2004). 
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these tend to be exceptional.  Most infringements upon privacy interests are 
actionable only under civil law, which means that the appropriate remedy is 
compensation for damages caused by the infringement—remedies that 
lack the stigma of disapproval that is attached to criminal convictions 
and punishment.  It is characteristic of the criminal law that it prohibits 
only the worst violations against individuals precisely because of the 
harm and stigma caused by punishment. 
Second, many criminal laws protecting physical security provide far 
more severe penalties than criminal laws protecting privacy interests.  
For example, murder is sometimes punishable by death or life in prison, 
whereas criminal laws protecting privacy interests provide penalties 
nowhere in the neighborhood of life in prison.  Similar things can be 
said about physical assaults and many crimes against property, such as 
burglary. 
Third, the criminal law will frequently allow proportional force in 
defense against culpably violent attacks that significantly threaten a 
person’s physical security.  Indeed, it is permissible under the criminal 
law to utilize deadly force when it appears reasonably necessary to save 
one’s own life or the life of other persons from a culpable attack.  
Physical assaults may also, as a matter of criminal law, be met with a 
proportionately forceful defense.  As far as I can tell, it is impermissible 
under the criminal law to prevent a criminal breach of privacy interests 
by resorting to force of any kind; and it would surely result in a charge 
of murder for a person to defend against a criminal breach of privacy by 
killing the perpetrator. 
Finally, the damages available in a civil suit are generally greater for 
acts that cause physical harm or death than for acts that merely breach 
privacy.  When damages for privacy breaches reach levels associated 
with damages normally assessed against acts that violate security interests, it 
is usually because the consequences of the privacy breach cause significant 
damage to financial interests.  Large awards are frequently available 
for defamation suits because the resulting harm to a person’s reputation 
entails a significant reduction in the victim’s capacity to earn a living; 
insofar as large damages are available for civil breaches of privacy 
interests, it is more likely to reflect concern for the plaintiff’s property 
interests, which count as security interests, than concern for the plaintiff’s 
interest in privacy.  Although this is not necessarily the case, this much 
is certainly true: civil damage awards for significant breaches of security 
interests are, other things being equal—for example, ability of the 
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respective attorneys—likely to be much larger than awards for significant 
breaches of privacy interests.  If the substantive content of the criminal 
and civil law is largely justified, the content of these laws provides yet 
another reason for thinking that privacy interests are not absolute and 
are, from the standpoint of morality, less important than security interests. 
Something very similar can be said about normative theories of 
constitutional law that assume that the content of constitutional law is 
generally justified and attempt to justify that content by reference to 
moral principles showing the content in its best moral light.  Whereas 
the Constitution expressly affords protection of the rights to life, liberty, 
and property, it does not expressly provide protection of privacy interests. 
It is true, of course, that some of the protections afforded to security rights 
are somewhat indirect—the Due Process Clause seems a peculiarly 
modest principle for protecting life and property—but the Constitution 
itself says nothing that clearly immediately implies any sort of protection of 
privacy.  Although the Supreme Court has, correctly in my view, inferred a 
right to privacy from the penumbra of more basic protections of liberty 
and security from unreasonable searches and seizures, this inference 
(1) is far more indirectly protected than the rights protected by the Due 
Process Clause and (2) has largely been construed to protect the right to 
reproductive privacy—or, perhaps more appropriately, liberty—with respect 
to the choice of whom to marry and whether to have children, and not 
anything that would count as informational privacy. 
While it is clear that some protection of informational privacy should 
be guaranteed by the state, whether in the form of statutes, common law, 
or constitutional law, the assumption that our Constitution is generally 
legitimate suggests yet another reason for thinking that privacy interests 
fall well short of being absolute and lack the importance of security 
interests.  A constitution that failed to protect life and liberty would surely 
be a moral nonstarter so to speak—that is, lacking content so important 
that it could not plausibly be regarded as generally legitimate—our 
Constitution is plausibly regarded as generally legitimate, despite lacking 
many protections of information privacy that ideally would be protected 
by a constitution that purports to lay down the “supreme law of the 
land.”  This suggests, again, that privacy interests lack the moral import 
of security interests. 
XIII.  SECURITY AS A PREREQUISITE FOR THE MEANINGFUL               
EXERCISE OF PRIVACY RIGHTS 
The last argument I wish to make in this essay will be brief because it 
is extremely well known and has been made in a variety of academic and 
nonacademic contexts.  The basic point here is that no right not involving 
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security can be meaningfully exercised in the absence of efficacious 
protection of security.  The right to property means nothing if the law 
fails to protect against threats to life and bodily security.  Likewise, the 
right to privacy has little value if one feels constrained to remain in 
one’s home because it is so unsafe to venture away that one significantly 
risks death or grievous bodily injury. 
This is not merely a matter of describing common subjective preferences; 
this is rather an objective fact about privacy and security interests.  If 
security interests are not adequately protected, citizens will simply not 
have much by way of privacy interests to protect.  While it is true, of 
course, that people have privacy interests in what goes on inside the 
confines of their home, they also have legitimate privacy interests in a 
variety of public contexts that cannot be meaningfully exercised if one is 
afraid to venture out into those contexts because of significant threats to 
individual and collective security—such as would be the case if terrorist 
attacks became highly probable in those contexts. 
It is true, of course, that to say that X is a prerequisite for exercising a 
particular right Y does not obviously entail that X is morally more 
important than Y, but this is a reasonable conclusion to draw.  If it is true 
that Y is meaningless in the absence of X, then it seems clear that X 
deserves, as a moral matter, more stringent protection than Y does.  
Since privacy interests lack significance in the absence of adequate 
protection of security interests, it seems reasonable to infer that security 
interests deserve, as a moral matter, more stringent protection than privacy 
interests. 
XIV.   CONCLUSION 
In this essay, I have argued that the moral interest in or right to privacy 
is not absolute and is sometimes outweighed by the moral interest in or 
right to security.  I have done so from two points of view.  First, at the 
beginning of the essay, I have sketched intuitions to that effect, which I 
assume are widely shared among persons in cultures like ours.  Second, I 
have argued that all the mainstream approaches to normative theories of 
state legitimacy presuppose, assert, or imply that privacy is less important 
from the standpoint of political morality than security.  Accordingly, 
under ordinary intuitions and each of these theories, security interests 
trump, or outweigh, privacy interests when the two come into conflict. 
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